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Articles

ABORTION AND ORIGINAL MEANING
Jack M. Balkin*

I. ORIGINALISM VERSUS LIVING
CONSTITUTIONALISM: A FALSE DICHOTOMY

In his famous critique of Roe v. Wade/ John Hart Ely remarked that if a principle that purportedly justifies a constitutional right "lacks connection with any value the Constitution
marks as special, it is not a constitutional principle and the Court
has no business imposing it." 2 Criticisms of Roe have generally
proceeded precisely on this ground: the right to sexual privacy is
not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, and there is no
evidence that the framers and adopters of the 1787 Constitution
or of any later amendments expected or intended the Constitution to protect a woman's right to abortion. It has become a
commonly held assumption among Roe's critics that there is no
constitutional basis for abortion rights or for a right of "privacy";
the right is completely made up out of whole cloth and therefore
supporters of abortion rights have cut themselves adrift from the
Constitution's text, history and structure. Even some defenders
of abortion rights have bought into these criticisms; they view
Roe v. Wade and privacy jurisprudence as a compelling reason to

* Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law
School. My thanks to Akhil Amar. Randy Barnett. Michael Kent Curtis, Mark Graber,
Mark Greenberg. Sanford Levinson. Reva Siegel. Lawrence Solum and participants at
the New York University Colloquium in Legal. Political and Social Philosophy and the
Georgetown Law Center Advanced Constitutional Law Colloquium for their comments
on previous drafts.
1. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
2. John Hart Ely. The Wages of Crying Wolf' A Comment on Roe v. Wade. 82
YALE L.J. 920. 949 (1973).
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accept a version of living constitutionalism that grows and
changes with the times.
The conventional wisdom about Roe, however, is wrong. The
right to abortion (although not the precise reasoning in Roe itself)
actually passes the test that Ely set out. It is in fact based on the
constitutional text of the Fourteenth Amendment and the principles that underlie it. That is so even though the framers and
adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment did not expect or intend
that it would apply to abortion. In this essay I offer an argument
for the right to abortion based on the original meaning of the constitutional text as opposed to its original expected application.
I argue, among other things, that laws criminalizing abortion
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's principle of equal citizenship and its prohibition against class legislation. A long history of
commentators has argued that abortion rights are secured by
constitutional guarantees of sex equality premised on some version of an antisubordination principle. 3 One of the goals of this
article is to show that the arguments of these commentators are
not novel or fanciful but have deep roots in the original meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the arguments I present
here, although specifically directed to the abortion controversy,
help underscore the constitutional and originalist pedigree of
much of the antisubordination literature.
A second, and larger purpose of my argument is to demonstrate why the debate between originalism and living constitutionalism rests on a false dichotomy. Originalists generally assume that if we do not apply the constitutional text in the way it
was originally understood at the time of its adoption we are not
following what the words mean and so will not be faithful to the
Constitution as law. But they have tended to conflate two differ3. See, e.g.. CASS R. SUNSTEIN. THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 270--85 (1993): Reva
Siegel. Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection. 44 STAN. L. REV. 261. 276--77, 350, 371-79 (1992); Guido
Calabresi. The Supreme Court, 1990 Term, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountabilitv (What the Bark-Brennan Debate lgnores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80.
103-D8 (1991); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under the Law, 100
YALE L.J. 1281. 1308-27 (1991): Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy. 102 HARV. L.
REV. 737. 782 (1989); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON. TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF
THE STATE 189-94 (1989): LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1354
(2d ed. 1988); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
955. 1020 (1984): Kenneth Karst. Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977): see also WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE
SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST
CONTROVERSIAL DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (opinions of Jack M. Balkin.
Reva Siegel, Jed Rubenfeld, Robin West and Akhil Amar).
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ent ideas- the expected application of constitutional texts, which
is not binding law, and the original meaning, which is. Indeed,
many originalists who claim to be interested only in original
meaning, like Justice Antonio Scalia, have encouraged this conflation of original meaning and original expected application in
4
their practices of argument. Living constitutionalists too have
mostly accepted this conflation without question. Hence they
have assumed that the constitutional text and the principles it
was designed to enact cannot account for some of the most valuable aspects of our constitutional tradition. They object to being
bound by the dead hand of the past. They fear that chaining ourselves to the original understanding will leave our Constitution
insufficiently flexible and adaptable to meet the challenges of
our nation's future. By accepting mistaken premises about interpretation- premises that they share with many originalistsliving constitutionalists have unnecessarily left themselves open
to the charge that they are not really serious about being faithful
to the Constitution's text, history and structure.
The choice between original meaning and living constitutionalism, however, is a false choice. I reject the assumption that
fidelity to the text means fidelity to original expected application. I maintain instead that constitutional interpretation requires fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution and to
the principles that underlie the text. The task of interpretation is
to look to original meaning and underlying principle and decide
how best to apply them in current circumstances. I call this the
method of text and principle. This approach, elaborated in Part
II, is faithful to the original meaning of the constitutional text,
and the purposes of those who adopted it. It is also consistent
with a basic law whose reach and application evolve over time, a
basic law that leaves to each generation the task of how to make
sense of the Constitution's words and principles. Although the
constitutional text and principles do not change without subsequent amendment, their application and implementation can.
That is the best way to understand the interpretive practices of
our constitutional tradition and the work of the many political
4. See infra text accompanying notes 9-15. During the 1980s and 1990s most conservative originalists moved from a theory based on original intentions or original understanding to one focused on original meaning. They assumed that this would defend
originalist methodology from various theoretical criticisms while preserving originalism's
critique of liberal judicial decisions. However. as I describe later in this symposium. the
shift to original meaning had unanticipated consequences. some of which my own work
tries to draw out. See Jack M. Balkin. Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption.
24 CONST. COMMENT. 427. 441-51 (2007).
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and social movements that have transformed our understandings
of the Constitution's guarantees.
The right to abortion is a good test case for this approach to
constitutional interpretation. Roe v. Wade is one of the canonical
decisions of the present era, as Brown v. Board of Education'
was for an earlier day, raising some of the most difficult and controversial constitutional questions. If the method of text and
principle can give a reasonable account of the constitutional
right to abortion, then it is likely to have considerable explanatory power in other contexts as well. In Parts III-VI, I offer the
case for abortion rights based on the original meaning of the
constitutional text and its underlying principles. Of course people can also use the same interpretive method to argue against
the right to abortion. That is not a weakness of the approach-it
shows how arguments from text and principle structure debate
about constitutional rights over time between people who disagree in good faith about the best way to interpret the Constitution. Nevertheless, I shall try to show why the arguments for the
abortion right are the most powerful and convincing.
Of course, demonstrating that the right to abortion flows
from the Constitution's original meaning does not end the matter. It does not tell us, for example, how to reconcile this right
with the state's legitimate interests in potential human life. The
Constitution's original meaning does not require either Roe's
trimester system6 or the later framework announced in Planned
7
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. These are
judicial constructions that attempt to vindicate the purposes behind the right and balance the relevant considerations. In Part
VII of this essay, I offer a better way of approaching these questions, one that the Supreme Court did not adopt. The key, I shall
argue, is to recognize that there are not one, but two different
rights to abortion. The first right is a woman's right not to be
forced by the state to bear children at risk to her life or health.
The second right is a woman's right not to be forced by the state
to become a mother and thus to take on the responsibilities of
parenthood, which, in our society are far more burdensome for
women than for men. As I shall explain, although the first right
to abortion continues throughout pregnancy, the second right
need not. It only requires that women have a reasonable time to
5. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
6. 410 U.S. 113, 163--64 (1973) (outlining trimester system).
7. 505 U.S. 833, 878--79 (1992) (replacing trimester system with line drawn at viability and undue burden test).
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decide whether or not to become mothers and a fair and realistic
opportunity to make that choice. Hence the second right to
abortion is consistent with the view that the state's interests grow
progressively stronger as the pregnancy proceeds.
II. THE METHOD OF TEXT AND PRINCIPLE
A. ORIGINAL MEANING VERSUS ORIGINAL EXPECTED
APPLICATION

Constitutional interpretation by judges requires fidelity to
the Constitution as law. Fidelity to the Constitution as law
means fidelity to the words of the text, understood in terms of
their original meaning, and to the principles that underlie the
text. It follows from these premises that constitutional interpretation is not limited to those applications specifically intended or
expected by the framers and adopters of the constitutional text.
Thus, for example, the Eighth Amendment's prohibitions on
"cruel and unusual punishments" bans punishments that are
cruel and unusual as judged by contemporary application of
these concepts (and underlying principles), not by how people
living in 1791 would have applied those concepts and principles.R
This marks the major difference between my focus on original meaning and the form of originalism that has been popular9
ized by Justice Antonin Scalia and others. Justice Scalia agrees
8. Many different scholars from different political perspectives have embraced the
idea that constitutional interpretation should be grounded in the text's original meaning.
See. e.g .. RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY (2004): Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term, Foreword: The
Document and the Doctrine. 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 28-29, 31 (2000): KEITH
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999): Ronald Dworkin. Comment. in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115. 116-19 (Amy Gutman ed ..
1997) (hereinafter Dworkin, Comment]: Ronald Dworkin. The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1249 (1997); KERMIT
ROOSEVELT. THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS (2006).
9. See Antonin Scalia. Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849. 86264 (1989) (hereinafter Scalia. Originalism]: ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144, 159 (1989): Antonin Scalia.

Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States Federal Courts
in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws. in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAw 3, 17 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia. Courts]:
RAOUL BERGER. FEDERALISM: THE FRAMERS' DESIGN (1987); Clarence Thomas. Judging. 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1996). Although Justice Thomas also emphasizes that he
looks to original meaning. he too tends to conflate original meaning and original expected application. See, e.g. Morse v. Frederick. 127 S. Ct. 2618. 2629. 2630 (2007) (Thomas. J.. concurring) (deciding if First Amendment protects student speech by looking to
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that constitutional fidelity requires fidelity to the original meaning of the constitutional text, and the meanings that words had at
10
the time they were adopted. He also agrees that the original
meaning of the text should be read in light of its underlying principles. But he insists that the concepts and principles underlying
those words must be applied in the same way that they would
have been applied when they were adopted. As he puts it, the
principle underlying the Eighth Amendment "is not a moral principle of 'cruelty' that philosophers can play with in the future, but
rather the existing society's assessment of what is cruel. It means
not ... 'whatever may be considered cruel from one generation to
the next,' but 'what we consider cruel today [i.e., in 1791 ]'; otherwise it would be no protection against the moral perceptions of a
future, more brutal generation. It is, in other words, rooted in the
moral perceptions of the time." 11 Scalia's version of "original
meaning" is not original meaning in my sense, but actually a more
limited interpretive principle, what I call original expected application.12 Original expected application asks how people living at the
time the text was adopted would have expected it would be applied using language in its ordinary sense (along with any legal
terms of art). When people use the term "original understanding,"
and sometimes even "original meaning"- as Scalia does- they
are actually talking about original expected application. Expectapractices of public schools in early 1800s and concluding that:'"If students in public
schools were originally understood as having free-speech rights. one would have expected 19th-century public schools to have respected those rights and courts to have enforced them. They did not."): Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n. 514 U.S. 334, 359
(Thomas, L concurring) (attempting to determine original meaning of First Amendment
by looking to "whether the phrase 'freedom of speech. or of the press.· as originally understood, protected anonymous political leafleting.")
10. Scalia. Courts. supra note 9. at 38 ("What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text. not what the original
draftsmen intended.").
11. Antonin Scalia. Response. in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 129, 140 (Amy Guttman ed .. 1997) [hereinafter Scalia. Response].
12. See Jack M. Balkin. Original Meaning and Original Application.
http:/lbalkin.blogspot.com/2005/06/original-meaning-and-original.html (last visited Aug.
11. 2006). Ronald Dworkin similarly distinguishes between "semantic originalism" and
'"expectations originalism": '"the crucial distinction between what some officials intended
to say in enacting the language they used, and what they intended-or expected, or
hoped-would be the consequence of their saying it." Dworkin. Comment, supra note 8.
at 116. Randy Barnett endorses a similar idea. See BARNETT. RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION, supra note 8. at 93-94. Mark Greenberg and Harry Littman have shown
how original meaning and what I am calling original expected application may come
apart over time. Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman. The Meaning of Original Meaning,
86 GEO. L.J. 569 (1998). As we will see infra. however. although ·•expectations originalism" provides a useful shorthand. "semantic originalism" is a bit of a misnomer, because
we are interested in more than semantics. i.e .. the dictionary definitions of words.
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tion-focused originalists can accommodate new phenomena and
new technologies -like television or radio- by analogical extension with phenomena and technologies that existed at the time of
adoption. But this does not mean, Scalia insists, that "the very acts
that were perfectly constitutional in 1791 (political patronage in
government contracting and employment, for example) may be
13
unconstitutional today."
B. MISTAKES AND ACHIEVEMENTS

Scalia realizes that his approach would allow many politically unacceptable results, including punishments that would
shock the conscience of people today. So he often allows deviations from his interpretive Rrinciples, making him what he calls a
"faint-hearted originalist." 4 For example, Scalia accepts the New
Deal settlement that gave the federal government vast powers to
regulate the economy that most people in 1787 would never have
15
dreamed of and would probably have strongly rejected.
Scalia's originalism must be "faint-hearted" precisely because he has chosen a unrealistic and impractical principle of interpretation, which he must repeatedly leaven with respect for
stare decisis and other prudential considerations. The basic problem with looking to original expected application for guidance is
that it is inconsistent with so much of our existing constitutional
traditions. 1" Many federal laws securing the environment, protecting workers and consumers-even central aspects of Social
Security-go beyond original expectations about federal power,
not to mention independent federal agencies like the Federal
Reserve Board and the Federal Communications Commission,
and federal civil rights laws that protect women and the disabled
from private discrimination. Even the federal government's
power to make paper money legal tender probably violates the
expectations of the founding generation. 17 The original expected
application is also inconsistent with constitutional guarantees of
13. See Scalia. Response. supra note II. at 140-41. (emphasis in original).
14. Scalia, Originalism. supra note 9. at 861-64.
15. See, e.g.. Gonzales v. Raich. 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (Scalia. J.. concurring).
16. See RICHARD H. FALLON. JR .. IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 15-17
(2001): Henry Monaghan. Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication. 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 723.723-24.727-39 (1988).
17. See Kenneth Dam, The Legal Tender Cases. 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 367.389 ("difficult to escape the conclusion that the Framers intended to prohibit" use of paper money
as legal tender); Hearings Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary lOOth Cong .. 1st Sess.
Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Part 1 at 84-85 (1987).

298

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 24:291

sex equality for married women, 18 with constitutional protection
19
of interracial marriage, with the constitutional right to use contraceptives,20 and with the modern scope of free speech rights
under the First Amendment. 21
The standard response to this difficulty is that courts should
retain nonoriginalist precedents (i.e., those inconsistent with
original expectation) if those precedents are well established, if
they promote stability, and if people have justifiably come to
rely on them. Interpretive mistakes, even though constitutionally
illegitimate when first made, can become acceptable because we
respect precedent. As Scalia explains, " [t ]he whole function of
the doctrine [of stare decisis] is to make us say that what is false
under proper analysis must nonetheless be held true, all in the
interests of stability." 22
There are four major problems with this solution. First, it
undercuts the claim that legitimacy comes from adhering to the
original meaning of the text adopted by framers and that decisions inconsistent with the original expected application are illegitimate. It suggests that legitimacy can come from public acceptance of the Supreme Court's decisions, or from considerations
of stability or economic cost.
Second, under this approach, not all of the incorrect precedents receive equal deference. Judges will inevitably pick and
choose which decisions they will retain and which they will discard based on pragmatic judgments about when reliance is real,
substantial, justified or otherwise appropriate. These characterizations are likely to conflate considerations of stability and potential economic expense with considerations of political acceptability- which decisions would be too embarrassing now to
discard- and political preference- which decisions particularly
rankle the jurist's sensibilities. Thus, one might argue that it is
18. See Frontiero v. Richardson. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See infra text at notes 66--70.
19. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965): Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438
(1971).
21. E.g.. Cohen v. California. 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (protecting public expressions of
profanity): Brandenburg v. Ohio. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (protecting advocacy of sedition
and law violation): New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding unconstitutional aspects of common law of defamation): Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(protecting pornography that does not fall within a narrowly defined three part test): 44
Liquormart. Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (protecting truthful nonmisleading
commercial speech from paternalistic regulation): Scalia, Response. supra note 11. at 138
(contemporary First Amendment protections are "irreversible" "whether or not they
were constitutionally required as an original matter").
22. SCALIA. Response. supra note 11, at 139.
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too late to deny Congress's power to pass the Civil Rights Act of
1964 under the Commerce Clause but express doubts about the
Endangered Species Act. One might accept that states may not
engage in sex discrimination but vigorously oppose the constitutional right to abortion or the unconstitutionality of anti-sodomy
statutes. This play in the joints allows expectations-based
originalism to track particular political agendas and allows
judges to impose their political ideology on the law-the very
thing that the methodology purports to avoid.
Third, allowing deviations from original expected application out of respect for precedent does not explain why these mistakes should not be read as narrowly as possible to avoid compounding the error, with the idea of gradually weakening and
overturning them, so as to return to more legitimate decisionmaking. If the sex equality decisions of the 1970's were mistakes,
courts should try to distinguish them in every subsequent case
with the goal of eventually ridding us of the blunder of recognizing equal constitutional rights for women.
This point leads naturally to the final, and more basic problem: Our political tradition does not regard decisions that have
secured equal rights for women, greater freedom of speech, federal power to protect the environment, and federal power to
pass civil rights laws as mistakes that we must unhappily retain; it
regards them as genuine achievements of American constitutionalism and sources of pride. These decisions are part of how
and why we understand ourselves to be a nation that has grown
freer and more democratic over time. No interpretive theory
that regards equal constitutional rights for women as an unfortunate blunder that we are now simply stuck with because of respect for precedent can be adequate to our history as a people. It
confuses achievements with mistakes, and it maintains them out
of a grudging acceptance. Indeed, those who argue for limiting
constitutional interpretation to the original expected application
are in some ways fortunate that previous judges rejected their
theory of interpretation; this allows them to accept as a starting
point nonoriginalist precedents that would now be far too embarrassing for them to disavow.
By contrast, a focus on text and principle views most, if not
all of these achievements as plausible constructions of constitutional principles that underlie the constitutional text and that
must be fleshed out in doctrine. 23 As I shall describe later on,
23.

For a related argument. see ROOSEVELT. supra note 8: FALLON. supra note 16.
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equal rights for women are fully consistent with the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and its underlying principles of equal citizenship and opposition to caste and class legislation.24 We need not regard decisions recognizing women's
equal rights as mistakes: quite the contrary, they are our generation's attempt to make sense of and implement the Constitution's text and its underlying principles. These decisions-and
others like them- do not sacrifice constitutional fidelity on the
altar of precedent; they demonstrate how development of judicial doctrine over time can implement and maintain constitutional fidelity. It is rather those who would retreat from the
achievements of our constitutional tradition or accept them only
grudgingly who lack fidelity, because they lack faith in the ability
and the authority of succeeding generations to accept the Constitution as their Constitution and to make constitutional text and
constitutional principles their own.
A central difference between expectations-based originalism and the method I advocate is that my approach recognizes
the great achievements of our country's constitutional tradition
as achievements and as signs of progress rather than as deviations and mistakes that sacrifice legitimacy and legality for the
sake of stability and respect for precedent. A second important
difference concerns how these two theories understand postenactment history and the work of social movements. Original
expectation originalism holds that social movements and political mobilizations can change constitutional law through the
amendment process of Article V. They can also pass new legislation, as long as that legislation does not violate the original expected application-as much federal post-New Deal legislation
might. But no matter how significant social movements like the
civil rights movement and the women's movement might have
been in our nation's history, no matter how much they may have
changed Americans' notion of what civil rights and civil liberties
belong to them, they cannot legitimately alter the correct interpretation of the Constitution beyond the original expected application. For example, no matter how profoundly the second wave
of American feminism altered our sense of what equality between men and women requires, it cannot change the original
Randv Barnett achieves a similar result through a combination of what he calls constitutionai interpretation and constitutional construction. See BARNETI. supra note 8. at 11827. The latter term is borrowed from KEITH WHITIINGTON. CONSTITUTIONAL
CO!\STRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999).
24. See infra text at notes 66-76.
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expected application of the Constitution. under which married
women did not have equal civil rights."' The federal government
can pass civil rights laws (assuming that these do not run afoul of
the original expected application of the Commerce Power). But
judges are not authorized to subject sex discrimination to constitutional scrutiny. At best we might maintain the mistaken decisions of the 1970s that found sex equality guarantees in the Constitution because it would be politically impossible to reject them
and because women have come to rely on them.
The model of text and principle views the work of social
movements and post-enactment history quite differently. The
constitutional text does not change without Article V amendment. But each generation of Americans can seek to persuade
each other about how the text and its underlying principles
should apply to their circumstances. their problems, and their
grievances. And because conditions are always changing, new
problems are always arising, and new forms of social conflict and
grievance are always being generated and discovered, the process of argument and persuasion about how to apply the Constitution's principles in new contexts is never-ending.
When people try to persuade each other about how the
Constitution and its principles apply to their circumstances, they
naturally identify with the generation that framed the constitutional text and they claim that they are being true to its principles. They can and do draw analogies between the problems,
grievances and injustices the adopters feared or faced and the
problems, grievances, and injustices of our own day. They also
can and do draw on the experiences and interpretive glosses of
previous generations-like the generation that produced the
New Deal or the civil rights movement-and argue that they are
also following in their footsteps.
Most successful political and social movements in America's
history have claimed authority for change in just this way: either
as a call to return to the enduring principles of the Constitution
or as a call for fulfillment of those principles. Thus, the key
tropes of constitutional interpretation by social movements and
political parties are restoration on the one hand, and redemption
on the other. Constitutional understandings change by arguing
about what we already believe, what we are already committed
to, what we have promised ourselves, what we must return to
and what commitments remain to be fulfilled.
25.

See infra text at notes 66-70.
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When political and social movements succeed in persuading
other people in the country that their interpretation is the right
one, they replace an older set of implementing constructions and
26
doctrines with a new one. These constructions and implementations may not be just or correct judged from the standpoint of
later generations, and they can be challenged later on. But that is
precisely the point. Each generation makes the Constitution
their Constitution by calling upon its text and its principles and
arguing about what they mean in their own time. Interpreting
the Constitution's text and principles is how each generation
connects back to the past and forward to the future.
Thus, it matters greatly, from the standpoint of text and
principle, that there was a women's movement in the early
1960's and 1970's that convinced Americans that both married
and single women were entitled to equal rights and that the best
way to make sense of the Fourteenth Amendment's principle of
equal citizenship was to apply it to women as well as men, despite the original expected application of the adopters. The equal
protection decisions of the 1970's that gave heightened scrutiny
to sex-based classifications are not "mistakes'' that we must
grudgingly live with. They are applications of text and principle
that have become part of our constitutional tradition through the
work of social movements and popular mobilizations. They
might be good or bad applications; they might be incorrect or incomplete. That is for later generations to judge. But when people accept them, as Americans accept the notion of equality for
women today, they are not simply doing so on the basis of reliance interests-i.e. that we gave women equal rights mistakenly
in the 1970's, and now it's just too late to turn back. They are doing so in the belief that this is what the Constitution actually
means, that this is the best, most faithful interpretation of constitutional text and principles.
26. I have explained how change in constitutional understandings operates through
social movement mobilization and the party system in Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson. From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State. 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 489 (2006): Jack M. Balkin. How Social Movements Change (Or Fail To Change)
the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure. 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27 (2005): Jack
M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson. Understanding the Constitutional Revolution. 87 VA. L.
REV. 1045 (2001 ). Judges have no obligation to pay attention to social movements, and
interpretations of the Constitution are not good ones simply because social movements
have adopted them. Nevertheless. waves of social and political mobilizations have shaped
the development and understanding of our Constitution. and contributed to some of its
most admirable features. A theory of constitutional interpretation should be able to explain why these changes in understanding are faithful to the Constitution rather than just
mistakes. For further discussion of this point. see Balkin. supra note 4. at 470-78, 507-11.
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Originalism based on original expected application fails because it cannot comprehend this feature of constitutional development except as a series of errors that it would now be too embarrassing to correct. Justice Scalia correctly and appropriately
notes that his reliance on nonoriginalist precedents is not consis27
tent with originalism, but rather a "pragmatic exception. " And
that is precisely the problem with his view: The work of social
movements in our country's history is not a "pragmatic exception" to fidelity to the Constitution. It is the lifeblood of fidelity
to our Constitution-an ongoing project of vindicating text and
principle in history.
In this way, the theory of text and principle explains-in a
way that original expectation originalism cannot-why the Constitution is more than the dead hand of the past, but is a continuing project that each generation takes on. It is a great work that
spans many lifetimes, a vibrant multi-generational undertaking,
in which succeeding generations pledge faith in the constitutional project and exercise fidelity to the Constitution by making
the Constitution their own.
None of this means that the original expected application is
irrelevant or unimportant. It helps us understand the original
meaning of the text and the general principles that animated the
text. But it is important not as binding law but rather as an aid to
interpretation, one among many others. It does not control how
we should apply the Constitution's guarantees today, especially
as our world becomes increasingly distant from the expectations
and assumptions of the adopters' era. The concepts embodied by
the words of constitutional text and the principles underlying the
text, and not their original expected application, are the central
concern of constitutional interpretation.
C. IMPLEMENTING TEXT AND PRINCIPLES
Although the original expected application is not binding,
the constitutional text is. That is because we have a written Constitution that is also enforceable law. We treat the Constitution
as law by viewing its text and the principles that underlie the text
as legal rules and legal principles. To do this we must ask what
the people who drafted the text were trying to achieve in choosing the words they chose, and, where their words presume underlying principles, what principles they sought to endorse.

27.

Scalia. Response. supra note 11. at 140.
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We look to the original meaning of the words because if the
meaning of the words changed over time, then the words will
embrace different concepts than those who had the authority to
create the text sought to refer to. We look to underlying principles because when the text uses relatively abstract and general
concepts, we must know which principles the text presumes or is
attempting to embrace. If we read the text to presume or embrace other principles, then we may be engaged in a play on
words and we will not be faithful to the Constitution's purposes.
Just as we look to the public meaning of words of the text at the
time of enactment, we discover underlying constitutional principles by looking to the events leading up to the enactment of the
constitutional text and roughly contemporaneous with it. 2g Sometimes the text refers to terms of art or uses figurative or nonliteral language. For example, the Copyright Clause in Article I,
Section 8 speaks of "writings," which is a non-literal use. It refers
to more than written marks on a page but also includes printing
and (probably) sculpture, motion pictures, and other media of
2
artistic and scientific communication. " The term "due process of
law" in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is a term of art; it
has a specialized legal meaning over and above the concatenation of the words in the phrase. In cases like these we must try to
figure out what principles underlie the term of art or the use of
figurative or non-literallanguage.3(1
28. Enactment history. however. is not the only thing we might look at to assess
underlying principles. See Balkin. supra note 4. at 486-503.
29. See also Scalia. Courts. supra note 9. at 37-38 (the text of the First Amendment
must be construed as a synecdoche in which .. speech .. and .. press .. stand for a whole
range of different forms of expression. including handwritten letters).
30. Ronald Dworkin's distinction between .. semantic originalism .. and "expectations originalism ... Dworkin. Comment. supra note 8. at 116. may be a little misleading
here. The term .. semantic originalism .. might suggest that Dworkin is making a distinction between semantics-the dictionarv definitions of words-and pragmatics-the
meanings of words in use or context. The problem is that original meaning-either in
Dworkin's sense or mine-cannot be limited to semantics. It is clearly also about pragmatics. that is. meaning in use and context. For example. Dworkin agrees that if we discover that certain words like .. bill of attainder .. were employed as terms of art. we must
use that specialized meaning and not the dictionary definition of the individual words
employed. Dworkin. Reflections on Fidelity. 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1799. 1806-08 (1997).
That is a claim about pragmatics. not semantics. In like fashion. we need to know
whether. in context of use. what seems to be abstract language in the constitutional text
(say of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause) is attempting to embrace
an abstract principle. or whether it was understood in context at the time to refer to a
laundrv list of relativelv specific applications. That too. is a question of pragmatics rather
than s~mantics. Some parts of the constitutional text were intended and expected in ordinarv usage to embrace relatively abstract principles. while others were not. becausefor example- they were generally understood to be terms of art. The language used is a
clue. but learning more about the surrounding history might change our minds on this
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Underlying principles are necessary to constitutional interpretation when we face a relatively abstract constitutional command rather than language that offers a fairly concrete rule, like
the requirement that there are two houses of Congress or that
the President must be 35 years of age. When the text is relatively
rule-like, concrete and specific, the underlying principles cannot
override the textual command. For example, the underlying goal
of promoting maturity in a President does not mean that we can
dispense with the 35 year age requirement." But where the text
is abstract, general or offers a standard, we must look to the
32
principles that underlie the text to make sense of and apply it.
Because the text points to general and abstract concepts, these
underlying principles will usually also be general and abstract.
Indeed, the fact that adopters chose text that features general
and abstract concepts is normally the best evidence that they
sought to embody general and abstract principles of constitutional law, whose scope, in turn, will have to be fleshed out later
on by later generations. Nevertheless recourse to underlying
principles limits the direction and application of the text and
therefore is essential to fidelity to the Constitution.
Some principles are directly connected to particular texts
and help us understand how to apply those texts. Other princi33
ples are inferred from the constitutional structure as a whole.
score. See Keith Whittington. The New Originalism. 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599. 61011 (2004).
In the case of the Fourteenth Amendment. we know that its language was written to
please both Moderates and Radicals. Precisely for this reason the language chosen was
about citizenship in general and not specifically about race discrimination. and its future
scope was left deliberately ambiguous. as a delegation to future generations. Alexander
Bickel. The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision. 69 HARV. L. REv. 1.
59-63 (1955) (Moderates and Radicals chose ''language capable of growth'' that would
paper over differences between them): WILLIAM E. NELSON. THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCfRINE 143-45 ( 1988) (language of Section One deliberately chosen to invoke broad statements of principle. leaving applications unsettled). See the discussion in Balkin. supra note 4. at 456-61. Hence if
we are concerned with pragmatics-use in context-there is no good reason to treat the
Fourteenth Amendment's general clauses as limited to a laundry list of specific applications.
31. In this example I assume that all the evidence we have suggests that the words
"attained to the age of thirty-five years" in Article II. section 4. were chosen to serve as a
rule. not a principle or standard. and. similarly. that there is no evidence that the words
should be understood in a non-literal sense. as in the case of the word "writings" in the
Copyright Clause.
32. As Randy Barnett reminds us. these underlying principles cannot override the
textual command but must be articulated and applied consistent with it. Randy Barnett,
Underlying Principles. 24 CONST. COMMENT. 405 (2007). See also Balkin. supra note 4. at
481-86.
33. John Hart Ely famously criticized the notion of a "clause bound interpretivism."
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For example, there is no single separation of powers clause in
the Constitution; rather we must derive the principle of separation of powers from how the various institutions and structures
outlined in the constitutional text relate to each other. The principle of democracy-which includes the subprinciple that courts
should generally defer to majoritarian decision-making-is nowhere specifically mentioned in the constitutional text, and yet it
may be the most frequently articulated principle in constitutional
argument. It is. ironically, the principle that people most often
use to object to courts inferring constitutional principles not spe34
cifically mentioned in the text. Although the principle of democracy does not directly appear in the text, it is inferred from
various textual features which presume democracy, and from the
basic character of our government as a representative and democratic republic.
Finally, many other materials gloss text and principles and
help apply them to concrete circumstances. These include not
only the original expected application but also post-enactment
history, including the work of social movements that have
changed our constitutional common sense, and judicial and nonjudicial precedents. These materials offer interpretations about
how to understand and apply the Constitution's structures and
guarantees. They are entitled to considerable weight. Precedents
in particular not only implement and concretize principles, they
also help settle difficult legal questions where reasonable people
can and do disagree. 35 Precedents also help promote stability and
rule of law values. However, because glosses and precedents accumulate and change over time, and because they often point in
contrasting directions, they are not always dispositive of constitutional meaning.
Constitutional doctrines created by courts, and institutions
and practices created by the political branches, flesh out and imJOHN HART ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 11-41
(1980) while Charles Black emphasized reading the Constitution in terms of its larger
structural themes. CHARLES BLACK, JR.. STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
34. In fact. Ely argued that the principle justified courts inferring certain rights and
liberties against majorities because they were necessary to democracy and to republican
government. ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST. supra note 33. The principle of democracy is not the same thing as simple majoritarianism; it does not automatically assume the
legitimacy of whatever procedures for decision-making happen to be in place.
35. For a useful discussion of how judicial and non-judicial precedents can serve the
goals of text and principle without displacing them. see Amar, supra note 8, at 43-44. 7889 (2000); see also FALLON. supra note 16; ROOSEVELT. supra note 8 (offering theories
for implementing constitutional meaning in doctrine).
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plement the constitutional text and underlying principles. But
they are not supposed to replace them. Doctrines, institutions
and practices can do the work of implementation well or poorly
depending on the circumstances, and some implementations that
seem perfectly adequate at one point may come to seem quite
inadequate or even perverse later on. But the Constitution, and
not interpretations of the Constitution, is the supreme law of the
land. Therefore it is always available to later generations to assert- and to try to convince others- that the best interpretation
of text and principle differs from previous implementing glosses,
and that we should return to the correct interpretation, creating
new implementing rules, practices and doctrines that will best
achieve this end. The tradition of continuous arguments about
how best to implement constitutional meaning in our own time
produces changes in constitutional doctrines, practices, and law.
That is why, ultimately, there is no conflict between fidelity to
text and principle and practices of constitutionalism that evolve
over time. Indeed, if each generation is to be faithful to the Constitution and adopt the Constitution's text and principles as its
own, it must take responsibility for interpreting and implementing the Constitution in its own era.
D. FIDELITY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
Expectations-based originalists may object that the textand-principle approach is indeterminate when the text refers to
abstract standards like ''equal protection" rather than concrete
rules. Therefore it does not sufficiently constrain judges. That
might be so if text and principle were all that judges consulted
when they interpreted the Constitution. But in practice judges
(and other constitutional interpreters) draw on a rich tradition of
sources that guide and constrain interpretation, including preand post-enactment history, original expected application, previous constitutional constructions and implementations, structural
and inter-textual arguments, and judicial and non-judicial precedents, to name only a few. In practice, judges who look to text
and principle face constraints much like those faced by judges
who purport to rely on original expected application. As we have
seen, the latter cannot and do not use original expected applications for a very large part of their work, because a very large part
of modern doctrine is not consistent with original expected application. So even judges who claim to follow the original understanding are, in most cases, guided and constrained by essentially
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the same sources and modalities of argument as judges employing the method of text and principle.
I think there is a deeper problem with the objection that the
method of text and principle does not sufficiently constrain
judges. Many theories of constitutional interpretation conflate
two different questions. The first is the question of what the
Constitution means and how to be faithful to it. The second asks
how a person in a particular institutional setting -like an unelected judge with life tenure-should interpret the Constitution
and implement it through doctrinal constructions and applications. The first is the question of fidelity; the second is the question of institutional responsibility.
Theories about constitutional interpretation that conflate
these two questions tend to view constitutional interpretation
from the perspective of judges and the judicial role; they view
constitutional interpretation as primarily a task of judges and they
assess theories of interpretation largely in terms of how well they
guide and limit judges. For example, one of the standard arguments for expectations-based originalism is that it will help constrain judges in a democracy. Alexander Bickel's theory of the
passive virtues and Cass Sunstein's idea of "minimalism," although often described as theories of constitutional interpretation,
are actually theories about the judicial role and how judges should
interpret the Constitution. So, too, obviously, are other theories of
"judicial restraint." From the perspective of these theories, nonjudicial interpreters are marginal or exceptional cases that we explain in terms of the standard case of judicial interpretation.
I reject this approach. Theories of constitutional interpretation should start with interpretation by citizens as the standard
case; they should view interpretation by judges as a special case
with special considerations created by the judicial role. In like
fashion, constitutional interpretations by executive officials and
members of legislatures are special cases that are structured by
their particular institutional roles. Instead of viewing constitutional interpretation by citizens as parasitic on judicial interpretation, we should view it the other way around.
Why emphasize the citizen's perspective? Each generation
must figure out what the Constitution's promises mean for themselves. Many of the most significant changes in constitutional
understandings (e.g., the New Deal, the civil rights movement,
the second wave of American feminism) occurred through mobilizations and counter-mobilizations by social and political
movements who offered competing interpretations of what the
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Constitution really means. Social and political movements often
understand their grievances and their demands in constitutional
terms- they argue for either a restoration of constitutional principles or a redemption of constitutional commitments. They
make claims about how the Constitution's text and principles
should be cashed out in present-day circumstances. Social and
political movements argue that the way that Constitution has
been interpreted and implemented before-for example, by
judges or other political actors-is wrong and that we need toreturn to the Constitution's correct meaning and redeem the Constitution's promises in our own day.
Often people do not make these claims in lawyerly ways,
and usually they are not constrained by existing understandings
and existing doctrine in the way that we want judges to be constrained. In fact, when social movements initially offer their constitutional claims, many people regard them as quite radical or
"off the wall." There was a time, for example, when the notion
that the Constitution prohibited what we now call sex discrimination seemed quite absurd. Yet it is from these protestant interpretations of the Constitution that later constitutional doctrines emerge. Many of the proudest achievements of our
constitutional tradition came from constitutional interpretations
that were at one point regarded as crackpot and "off the wall."
I hasten to add that most of these arguments go nowhere.
Only a few have significantly changed how we look at the Constitution. Successful social and political movements must persuade
other citizens that their views are correct, or, at the very least,
they must convince people to compromise and modify their views.
If movements are successful, they change the minds of the general
public, politicians and courts. This influence eventually gets reflected in new laws, in new constitutional doctrines, and in new
constitutional constructions. Successful social and political mobilization changes political culture, which changes constitutional culture, which, in turn, changes constitutional practices outside of the
courts and constitutional doctrine within them.
The causal influences, of course, do not run in only one direction. Judicial interpretations like those in Brown v. Board of
Education or Miranda v. Arizona 36 can become important parts
of our constitutional culture; they can be absorbed into ordinary
citizens' understandings of what the Constitution means, and
they can act as focal points for citizen reaction. Nevertheless, we
36.

384 U.S. 486 (1966).
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cannot understand how constitutional understandings change
over time unless we recognize how social movements and political parties articulate new constitutional claims, create new constitutional regimes and influence judicial constructions.
To understand how these changes could be faithful to the
Constitution, we must have a theory that makes the citizen's perspective primary. I do not claim that all social mobilizations that
produce changes in doctrine are equally legitimate or equally
admirable. But some are both legitimate and admirable, and a
theory of constitutional interpretation- which is also a theory of
constitutional fidelity- must account for them. The text -andprinciple approach can offer a much better explanation of how
successful social and political movements make claims that are
faithful to the Constitution than expectations-based originalism
can. Indeed, as we have seen, expectations-based originalism is
virtually useless for this purpose, because it views many of the
most laudatory changes in our understandings of the Constitution as not faithful to the Constitution and therefore illegitimate.
For similar reasons, expectations-based originalism cannot
really constrain judges because too many present-day doctrines
are simply inconsistent with it; as a result judges must pick and
choose based on pragmatic justifications that are exceptions to
the theory. Because expectations-based originalism conflates the
question of constitutional fidelity with the question of judicial
constraint, it offers the wrong answer to both questions.
Constraining judges in a democracy is important. But in
practice most of that constraint does not come from theories of
constitutional interpretation. It comes from institutional features
of the political and legal system. Some of these are internal to
law and legal culture, like the various sources and modalities of
legal argument listed above. Others are "external" to legal reasoning but nevertheless strongly influence what judges produce
as a group.
First, judges are subject to the same cultural influences as
everyone else- they are socialized both as members of the public and as members of particular legal elites. Second, the system
of judicial appointments and the practices of partisan entrenchment determine and limit who gets to serve as a judge. Third,
lower federal courts are bound to apply Supreme Court precedents. Fourth, the Supreme Court is a multi-member body
whose decisions in contested cases are usually decided by the
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median or "swing" Justice. Over time, this keeps the Court's
37
work near the center of public opinion.
This combination of internal and external features constrains judicial interpretation in practice far more effectively
than any single theory of interpretation ever could; it does much
of the work in constructing which constitutional interpretations
are reasonable and available to judges and which are "off the
wall." Equally important, this combination of internal and external factors keeps judicial decisions in touch with popular understandings of our Constitution's basic commitments, continually
translating, shaping and refining constitutional politics into constitutional law.
In short, we should not confuse the question of what it takes
for actors in the system- including those actors who are not
judges- to be faithful to the Constitution with the question of
what features of the system constrain judicial interpretation. We
must separate these questions to understand how constitutional
fidelity occurs over time. When we do, we can also see why fidelity to original meaning and belief in a living Constitution are not
at odds.
III. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Even if the right to abortion was not specifically contemplated or intended by the framers and adopters of the Constitution, it might follow as a consequence of principles that underlie
the constitutional text. What text and what principles would
those be? In Roe v. Wade itself, Justice Blackmun, invoking a
history of previous judicial precedents, argued that the right
came from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which says that "[n]o state ... shall ... deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 3 Many
people doubt that the Due Process Clause regulates more than
procedures, because the text refers to "due process of law."
In fact, the Due Process Clause, as originally understood,
did have some substantive content. "Due process of law" was a
term of art thought to be roughly synonymous with the idea of
"law of the land" from Magna Carta.w It was designed not only
37. See sources cited supra note 26.
38. U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV.§ 1.
39. See James W. Ely Jr.. The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Realitv in the
Origins of Substantive Due Process. 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315 (1999): Murray's Lessee v.
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to prohibit unfair procedures but also to protect vested rightsfor example, vested rights of property- from being destroyed b~
government or transferred from one private party to another.
Even under this reading, however, it is unclear whether the right
to abortion is such a vested right. (Moreover, as I shall describe
later on, the meaning of the term of art "due process of law"
changed during the antebellum period. There is considerable
evidence that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment may have been designed in part to enforce the
Amendment's prohibition on so-called class legislation, which is
also one of the underlying purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause. 41 )
Many people assume that the only possible source of the
right to abortion would be a right to "privacy" found in the Due
Process Clause, because that is where the Supreme Court found
it in Roe v. Wade. Because they are unconvinced that the Due
Process Clause offers substantive protections, or because they
doubt that the right to privacy was intended to be one of those
protections, they assume that the right to abortion has no constitutional basis.
Even if the right to abortion is not a vested right protected
under the Due Process Clause, however, that does not mean that
the right to abortion has no constitutional basis in the original
meaning of the constitutional text or the principles underlying
the text. The source of the right is the Fourteenth Amendment,
but not necessarily the Due Process Clause. In fact, the other
parts of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are far
more relevant to this question. The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment contains a Citizenship Clause, which states
that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside." It contains a Privileges or Immunities Clause, which says that "[n]o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States." And it contains an
Equal Protection Clause, which holds that "[n]o state ...
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro42
tection of the laws. "

Hoboken Land & Improvement Co .. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272. 276 (1856).
40. Ely. supra note 39, at 332-33.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 47-53.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ 1.
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The reason why the courts look to the Due Process Clause
today is because of the Supreme Court's initial misinterpretation
43
of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases in
1873. The Slaughter-House Cases severely limited the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, mangled the constitutional text and caused
enormous mischief in subsequent years. Because the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was effectively read out of the Constitution,
litigators and courts turned instead to the Due Process Clause
(and still later to the fundamental rights doctrines arising out of
the Equal Protection Clause) to do much of the work that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause should have performed.
The purpose of the Citizenship, Privileges or Immunities,
and Equal Protection Clauses, and indeed of the entire Fourteenth Amendment, was to secure equal citizenship, equal civil
rights, and civil equality for all citizens of the United States.
(The Equal Protection Clause, which speaks of "person[s] within
[the) jurisdiction" of states, extended basic rights to resident
aliens as well.) The principle of civil equality meant that all persons were equal before the law with respect to basic civil rights,
which were the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States, and that the states could not make arbitrary or invidious
discriminations among persons.
One of the best summaries of the principles underlying the
text of the Fourteenth Amendment is the speech that Senator
Jacob Howard of Michigan gave when he introduced the Fourteenth Amendment to the Senate on May 23, 1866. Howard was
a member of the Joint House-Senate Committee on Reconstruction (the Committee of Fifteen) that drafted the Amendment,
and he acted as the floor manager for the Amendment in the
Senate, presenting it with a speech that stated the Committee's
official views about the Amendment's purposes. 44
Howard explained that the purpose of section one of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to "disable [the states] from passing laws trenching upon those fundamental rights and liberties
which belong to every citizen of the United States and to all persons who happen to be within their jurisdiction."45 (Thus, Howard assumed that aliens as well as citizens would enjoy basic civil
rights against state governments). The "great object" of the

43.
44.
ard).
45.

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.. 1st Sess. 2764-68 (1866) (statement of Sen. How/d. at 2766.
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Privileges or Immunities Clause was '"to restrain the power of
the States and compel them at all times to respect these great
fundamental guarantees."~" Howard emphasized that these privileges and immunities of citizenship "cannot be fully defined in
their entire extent and precise nature."~ Many of them were unenumerated. He offered as a preliminary sampling the list produced by Justice Bushrod Washington in Corfield v. Coryell,-!8,
who was interpreting the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, section 2. 49 Washington himself noted that the privileges and immunities of citizenship could not be exhaustively
enumerated, but that they included. among other things, the
rights to "protection by the government, [to] enjoyment of life
and liberty ... to pass through, or to reside in any other state, ...
to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus: to institute and
maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state [and] to
take, hold and dispose of property."'" "[T]o these.'' Howard, explained, "should be added the personal rights guaranteed and
1
secured by the first eight amendments to the Constitution,"' that
is, the individual rights guarantees of the Bill of Rights.'c
The Equal Protection Clause, together with the Due Process Clause, Howard explained, was designed to "abolish[] all
class legislation in the States and do[] away with the injustice of
subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another."'3 Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment "establishes
7

46. /d.
47. /d. at 2765.
48. Corfield v. Coryell. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3.230).
49. Note that for ·Howard. as for the manv of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment. the words .. Privileges or Immunities ~f citizens of the United States .. were
deliberately chosen to mirror the phrase '"Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the
Several States .. in Article IV. Section 2. Just as states could not deny basic civil rights to
non-citizens because of Article IV. Section 2. they now could not deny basic civil rights to
their own citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment.
50. Corfield. 6 F. Cas. at 551-52.
51. CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
52. Although the list of fundamental rights was not limited to those specifically
mentioned in the Constitution. and although Justice Washington had included suffrage in
his list. Howard cautioned that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not guarantee the
right to vote: .. The right of suffrage. is not. in Jaw. one of the privileges or immunities
thus secured by the Constitution:· !d. at 2766. Speaking in 1871. John Bingham also suggested that some of the rights listed in Corfield had a different status than the individual
rights provisions of the Bill of Rights. which he viewed as central examples of substantive
rights protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. CONG. GLOBE. 42d Cong .. 1st
Sess. app. at 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham). See Michael Kent Curtis. Resurrecting che Privileges or Immunicies Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases Wichouc
Exhuming Lochner: Individual Righcs and the Fourteenth Amendment. 38 B.C. L. REV 1.
70-71 (1996).
53. /d. Howard explained:
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equality before the law, and it gives to the humblest, the poorest,
and the most despised of the race the same rights and the same
protection as it gives to the most powerful, the most wealthy, or
54
the most haughty."
The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equality before
the law prohibited several different types of unequal treatment,
each of which overlapped with the others.'' The first was legislation that made arbitrary and unreasonable distinctions between
citizens or persons. 56 The second was "special" or "partial" legislation that picked out a group for special benefits or special burdens. This is generally what was meant by "class legislation," an
57
idea that has its roots in Jacksonian ideology. The third was
"caste" legislation, that is, legislation that created or maintained

It prohibits, the hanging of a black man for a crime for which the white man is
not to be hanged. It protects the black man in his fundamental rights as a citizen
with the same shield which it throws over the white man. Is it not time. Mr.
President. that we extend to the black man. I had almost called it the poor privilege of the equal protection of the law~ Ought not the time to be now passed
when one measure of justice is to be meted out to a member of one caste while
another and a different measure is meted out to the member of another caste.
both castes being alike citizens of the United States. both bound to obey the
same taws. to sustain the burdens of the same Government. and both equally
responsible to justice and to God for the deeds done in the body?
/d. Although Howard began by referring to both the Equal Protection Clause and the
Due Process Clause in his account: his reference to "equal protection of the law" suggests the Equal Protection Clause was expected to take the lead in securing equality.
Nevertheless. the Due Process Clause was also relevant to the general prohibition against
class legislation. because the antebellum idea of due process also included the notion that
laws should be general and impartial and not for the benefit of any particular class. See
Mark G. Yudof. Equal Protection, Class Legislation and Sex Discrimination: One Small
Cheer For Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics. 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366. 1376 (1990) ("The
idea that laws should be general and not tainted by considerations of class or caste was
widely recognized and accepted before the fourteenth amendment was enacted. It was
part-and-parcel of the presumed fairness of governmental processes. of due process of
law."): Melissa L. Saunders. Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness. 96
MICH. L. REV. 245,258-59 & n.58 (1997): Ely. supra note 39. at 337-38.
54. CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
55. The various strands are described in NELSON. supra note 30. at 115-47 and in
Yudof. supra note 53 (reviewing Nelson).
56. See NELSON. supra note 30. at 115. 138-42.
57. See Yudof. supra note 53. at 1376-77: Saunders. supra note 53. at 289-90 &
n.198 (1997): NELSON supra note 30. at 115. 149: HOWARD GILLMAN. THE
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWER
JURISPRUDENCE. 46-60. 62 (1993). In his 1832 veto message concerning the charter of
the second national bank. Andrew Jackson gave a canonical account of the equal protection principle: The law should make no "artificial distinctions. to grant titles. gratuities.
and exclusive privileges. to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful." •·If [taw]
would confine itself to equal protection. and. as Heaven does its rains. shower its favors
alike on the high and the low. the rich and the poor. it would be an unqualified blessing."
Andrew Jackson. Veto Message (July 10. 1832). in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 576-89 (Richardson ed .. 1897).
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a disfavored caste or subordinated a group through law. 58 The
fourth was legislation that selectively restricted or abridged basic
rights of citizenship and that therefore treated people as second59
class citizens.
The job of doctrine in constitutional interpretation is to
concretize and make applicable the abstract commitments of
constitutional text and constitutional principle. 60 Where the text
is concrete and determinate, no doctrinal gloss is necessary, and
doctrine may not contradict it. Doctrine does most of its work
when textual commitments are abstract and the principles that
underlie them are also abstract. That is the case with the Fourteenth Amendment. When courts create doctrine to implement
and actualize text and principle, they create tests that are presumably easier to manage and apply to concrete cases; but, in
the process, they may create rules that are underinclusive and
overinclusive with respect to the best understanding of constitutional text and principles. Moreover, over time, the doctrinal
tests and tools that courts create to apply constitutional text and
principle may become increasingly unwieldy and inadequate to
enforce and implement the textual and principled commitments
in the Constitution. Or courts may simply make initial mistakes

58. See CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong.. 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Howard)
(Fourteenth Amendment ··does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons
to a code not applicable to another"): see also id. at 674 (remarks of Sen. Sumner) (proposed joint resolution for Reconstruction-a predecessor of the Fourteenth Amendment-would abolish "oligarchy. aristocracy. caste. or monopoly with particular privileges and powers"): Adamson v. California. 332 U.S. 46.51 n.8 (1947) (quoting Sumner's
joint resolution as evidence of meaning of Fourteenth Amendment): ANDREW KULL.
THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 74-75 (1992) (also quoting Sumner's joint resolution
as evidence of meaning of Fourteenth Amendment).
59. CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong.. 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Stevens)
("This amendment ... allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States. so
far that the law that operates upon one man shall operate equally upon all.") (emphasis
in original). John Harrison and David Currie have argued that equality of treatment with
respect to basic civil rights was guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. and
not the Equal Protection Clause. which applies to non-citizens as well. See John Harrison. Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 101 YALE L.J. 1385. 1387-88
(1992): DAVID CURRIE. THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS 342-51 (1985). Harrison argues that the Equal Protection Clause was
quite limited in its reach by modern day standards. and mostly protected against discriminatory remedies and protections or discriminatory enforcement by executive officials. Harrison. supra. at 1390. 1396. 1435-38. However. Senator Howard's speech suggests that the Equal Protection Clause was the text that embodied the principle against
class. caste. and subordinating legislation. See CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 2766
(1866) (remarks of Sen. Howard).
60. For useful accounts of this process. see FALLON. supra note 16: see also
ROOSEVELT. supra note 8: Amar. The Document and The Doctrine. supra note 8.
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that misapply or even undermine the constitutional text and
principles.
The doctrinal implementation of the Fourteenth Amendment from Reconstruction onward bears all of these characteristics. The Court's initial construction of the text in the SlaughterHouse Cases adopted a narrow construction of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause that essentially made the clause irrelevant.
The Slaughter-House Court was worried that a broad reading of
the clause would take too much power from the states and place
it in the hands of Congress, which had the power to protect privileges and immunities by federal legislation. However, the
Court's crabbed reading was not faithful to the constitutional
text and underlying constitutional principles because the Privilege or Immunities Clause was supposed to be the Amendment's
major source for constitutional protection of both civil liberty
and civil equality.
Because the Court made the clause practically irrelevant,
lawyers offered arguments for fundamental rights during the
19th and 20th centuries in terms of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause. Litigants argued, and the Court eventually
agreed, that the Due Process Clause protected certain substantive rights from abridgement by the states. This created considerable resistance over the years because the Due Process Clause
by its terms seems to refer to fair processes (and, as we have
seen, historically, the protection of vested rights). Discovering
fundamental rights in the Due Process Clause made far less
sense than asking whether such rights were privileges or immunities of national citizenship. That is especially so given that the
text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause clearly seems to refer
to a series of unspecified substantive rights against government.
In the middle of the 20th century, the Supreme Court briefly
flirted with protecting fundamental rights through the Equal
Protection Clause." 1 But the same criticism could apply here as
well: why does a clause about equal protection guarantee particular substantive rights? Thus, the Court's decision in Slaughter-House helped delegitimate the protection of basic rights and
liberties of citizenship that was one of the Fourteenth Amendment's central purposes.
To make matters worse, for many years the Supreme Court
assumed that the individual rights provisions of the Bill of Rights
61.

Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U.S. 61R (I '169): Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections. 383

u.s. 663. 668 (1966 ).
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were not privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States, even though there is considerable evidence that the formulation "Privileges or Immunities of citizens of the United
States" specifically referred to these rights."2 Indeed, Senator
Howard's speech introducing the Amendment in the Senate specifically noted that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected
"the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight
amendments to the Constitution," 63 The Court slowly began to
incorporate these rights into the Fourteenth Amendment many
years later, arguing that they were part of the "liberty" protected
by the Due Process Clause. By the late 1960's most (but not all)
of the individual rights provisions of the Bill of Rights had been
so incorporated. However, there is little reason to think that the
Due Process Clause was the primary vehicle through which the
provisions of the Bill of Rights applied against the states. Once
again, the doctrinal structure bequeathed by the SlaughterHouse Cases made the process of constitutional interpretation
far more counterintuitive than it should have been.
During the twentieth century, the Court implemented the
equal citizenship, caste legislation and class legislation principles
by creating a set of doctrines of scrutiny for different types of
classifications.''4 However, it is by no means clear that a focus on
classifications is the same thing as a focus on equal citizenship,
caste legislation, or class legislation. Governments need not engage in overt classification in order to subordinate a group or to
impose special benefits or burdens. Rather, we know whether
law subordinates by its social meanings and its effects within existing social and political structures. Focusing on classification
sometimes does protect against legislation that promotes social
subordination and the maintenance of caste, but at other times it
does not. Hence the doctrinal focus on classification often under-

62. For a discussion. see AKHIL AMAR. THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCIION (1998). See also Richard L. Aynes. On Misreading John Bighman and
the Fourteenth Amendment. 103 YALE L. J. 57 (1993): MICHAEL KENT CURTIS. No
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
(1985).
63. CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
64. See, e.g .. United States v. Carolene Products Co .. 304 U.S. 144. 153 n.4 (1938)
(special scrutiny for laws that burden discrete and insular minorities): Loving v. Virginia.
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (strict scrutiny for racial classifications): Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968) (strict scrutiny for classifications burdening illegitimacy): Graham v. Richardson.
403 U.S. 365 (1971) (strict scrutiny for state classifications burdening alienage); Craig v.
Boren. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (heightened scrutiny for sex classifications): Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center. Inc .. 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (heightened rational basis scrutiny for
classifications based on prejudice or animus).
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protects. Sometimes the doctrine overprotects too, causing constitutional difficulties for laws and policies that do not maintain
~aste~rel.ations ?r second class c~tizenship .and. max actually assist
m rehevmg vanous forms of socral subordmatron. ·
In interpreting the Constitution, therefore, we should always understand doctrine as a means to an end, and not as an
end in itself. We should understand it as a good faith attempt by
courts, sometimes successful, and other times less so, to implement relatively abstract commitments we find in the original
meaning of the constitutional text and its underlying principles.
Sometimes the solutions that courts come up with to flesh out
text and principle are good enough for the immediate purposes
at hand, but prove increasingly unworkable or contrary to the
text and its underlying principles as glosses are placed upon
glosses and as time and circumstances change. When novel problems present themselves, revealing the limitations of previous
implementations of text and principle, we must always be prepared to rethink the doctrinal structure in light of these more basic objects of constitutional fidelity. We should always attempt to
develop and employ constitutional doctrine with text and principle in mind.
In Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court found the constitutional
right to abortion in the substantive protections of the Due Process Clause. It is likely, however, that the real source of this right
lies elsewhere. To determine whether rights to abortion are
guaranteed by the Constitution, we must ask whether laws restricting abortion deny women equal citizenship. They might do
so because these laws are class or caste legislation or because
they help create or maintain second class citizenship or a subordinate status for women in American society. Or they might do
so because they deny privileges or immunities of national citizenship. If the answer to either of these questions is yes, then we
should interpret or extend constitutional doctrine to include and
protect abortion rights.
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION AND EQUAL CITIZENSHIP
Laws that discriminate against women and keep them in
conditions of dependency violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause because they violate the principles
65. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel. The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Anrisubordination?. 58 U. MIA\11 L. REV. 9 (2003).
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against class legislation, caste legislation, and subordinating legislation. The Congress that drafted the Fourteenth Amendment
assumed that its guarantees applied to all persons, men and
women alike, and that men and women were civil equals; but
they were complacent about a whole range of laws and practices
that effectively kept women in a subordinate condition and eco06
nomically dependent on men. In particular, they did not expect
that the new amendment would disturb the common law coverture rules, under which married women surrendered most of
their common law rights under the fiction that they consented
upon marriage to the merger of their legal identity into their
7
husband's." Although the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment asserted that women and men were civilly equal, they assumed that existing laws and practices-including coverturedid not deny women equal citizenship or subordinate them. 68 The
effect of these rules was to place most women in positions of
second-class citizenship, for most women moved fairly quickly
from living in their father's house to that of their husband. As
Justice Bradley explained in his 1873 concurrence in Bradwell v.
69
Illinois, which upheld a general prohibition on women becoming members of the Illinois Bar, "[i]t is true that many women
are unmarried and not affected by any of the duties, complications, and incapacities arising out of the married state, but these

66. Thus. Akhil Amar notes that ·•[t]he Fourteenth Amendment. in some ways. was
designed to give everyone - all persons. all citizens - certain civil rights. These rights were
largely defined by the status of unmarried white women."' Akhil Reed Amar. Women
and the Constitution. 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 465. 468 (1995). However. as Amar
also notes. when women married. they lost most of these rights. See id. at 468 n.l4. See
also Ward Farnsworth. Women Under Reconstruction: The Congressional Understanding.
94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1229. 1241 (2000) (''Until she joined a family as a wife and mother. a
femme sole [i.e .. an unmarried woman] was a family of one and could hold property: but
once she married. her property rights yielded to the order of the family circle. She then
enjoyed vicariously the rights held by the men in the family."").
67. Similar reasoning was used to justify women's exclusion from the franchise. See
Reva B. Siegel. She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism,
and the Famill'. 115 HARV. L. REV. 947. 981-84 (2002) (noting that both common law
coverture rule.s and theory of virtual representation of women by their husbands and fathers stemmed from republican theory of household as the unit of society. and the head
of the household as the representative of its dependents).
68. See CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong. 1st session. at 1089 (Feb. 28. 1866) (remarks of
Rep. Bingham) (noting that states would retain ability to regulate married women's
ownership of property because property rights were governed by local law while "[t]he
rights of life and liberty are theirs [i.e .. women's] whatever States may enact"); CONG.
GLOBE. 39th Cong.. 1st Sess. 1064 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Stevens) (""When a distinction
is made between two married people or two femmes sole. then it is unequal legislation:
but where all of the same class are dealt with in the same way then there is no pretense of
inequality.").
69. 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
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are exceptions to the general rule. The paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of
civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of
70
things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases."
Nevertheless, in interpreting the Constitution we must distinguish between the original meaning of the text and its original
expected application. Fidelity to the Constitution requires only
the first; not the second. We are interested in the text that the
adopters wrote and the basic principles they sought to establish,
not how they expected that text and those principles would be
applied to concrete cases.
The first wave of American feminism challenged the sexist
assumptions of the generation that formulated the Fourteenth
Amendment; their efforts culminated in the Nineteenth
Amendment, which bestowed political equality on women. The
debate over and subsequent ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment fatally undermined the premise on which the common law rules of coverture had been based, namely, that men
71
adequately represented women's interests. If women had the
right to vote because men did not adequately represent their interests in political life, it seemed to follow that men did not necessarily adequately represent all of their interests in economic
and social life. If women were deemed competent to make the
most important political decisions affecting the future of the republic through the franchise, it was hard to maintain that they
lacked competence to make basic decisions about their own lives
that involved entering into contracts and owning and disposing
of property. Years later the second wave of American feminism
convinced Americans that laws that discriminate against women
violate basic principles of equal citizenship in our Constitution. 72
The original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
guarantees civil equality and equality before the law for all persons, therefore presents no bar to the conclusion that sex dis70. !d. at 141--42. Bradwell was decided the day after Slaughter-House. with all of
the Slaughter-House dissenters joining the majority. Only Chief Justice Chase dissented
in Bradwell without opinion.
71. Siegel. supra note 67. at 987-93. 1012-19: id. at 1019 (""[I]n the immediate aftermath of ratification. both the Supreme Court and Congress understood the Nineteenth Amendment to redefine citizenship for women in ways that broke with the marital
status traditions of the common law. But neither the Court nor Congress acted consistently on this understanding.").
72. Reva B. Siegel. Constitwional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA. 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
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crimination violates the Constitution. The text of section 1 does
not exclude women from its protections, and the underlying
principle of equal citizenship applies to men and women
73
equally. This fact exemplifies one of the major differences between an approach to constitutional interpretation based on
original meaning and an approach based on original understanding or original intentions. While an approach grounded in original understanding or original intention has great difficulty justifying the Supreme Court's sex equality jurisprudence beginning
74
with Reed v. Reed and Frontiero v. Richardson, 75 an approach
based on original meaning does not. The fact that Congress in
1972 had submitted the ERA to the states (which ultimately
failed to gain ratification by three fourths of the states) does not
by itself demonstrate that constitutional protection of sex equality is inconsistent with original meaning. Rather, it demonstrates
only, as the Supreme Court noted in Frontiero, that by 1972
"Congress itself ha[ d] concluded that classifications based upon
sex are inherently invidious. " 76
Assuming then, that women as well as men are protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal citizenship principle, the
next question is whether laws criminalizing abortion violate that
principle.
One might argue that, because only women can become
pregnant, laws restricting abortion do not violate sex equality,
because they do not treat women differently from similarly situated men. There are no similarly situated men. The principle of
equal citizenship, however, is not limited to the requirement that
laws be formally equal in this way. 77 The relevant question is not
whether men and women are different in their capacity to bear
children, but the difference that this difference should be allowed to make in terms of women's status in society and their
enjoyment of basic rights of citizenship. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment, and principles underlying the Amendment
stand for the propositions that the state may not create or maintain a lower caste of citizens, impose second-class citizenship, or
effect subordination of a social group through law. When the
73. That is not true of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. which presumes
that women had no constitutional right to vote, but which was also superseded by the
Nineteenth Amendment.
74. 404 u.s. 71 (1971 ).
75. 411 u.s. 677 (1973).
76. !d. at 687.
77. See Saunders. supra note 53. at 288-89, 287 n.189 (class legislation was legislation that was not general in its effects. but imposed special burdens.).
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state uses women's capacity to become pregnant as a lever to
subordinate women, assign them a second class status in society,
or deny them full and equal enjoyment of their rights of citizenship, it violates the equal citizenship principle. It may not use
pregnancy as a device to deny women equal citizenship or subordinate women precisely because only women can get pregnant.
Traditionally, blacks have been relegated to second class
status by separation, degredation, and the abuse of the criminal
justice system. But the lower status of women in society has been
produced through enforcing role differentiation between the
sexes, usually justified by paternalism and repeated appeals to
nature and biological differences between men and women.
Women's inequality has come not from separating them from
men, but by making sure that they are remitted to traditional occupations of home and family and through denying them opportunities beyond those activities socially marked as "women's
work." We see this ideology clearly in Justice Bradley's argument that women could be excluded from the bar because "[t]he
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble
7
and benign offices of wife and mother. " H
Laws that criminalize abortion impose special burdens on
women not suffered by men. They force women to do two
things. First, they require women to bear children against their
will. They require a woman's body to undergo the strains of
pregnancy and the difficulties of childbirth without her consent.
In some cases, these may risk her health or even her life.
Second, laws that criminalize abortion require women,
against their will, to become mothers, with all that this word implies. Motherhood is more than a purely biological relationship:
it comes with a set of social and moral expectations and conventions. When a child comes into the world, social pressure, legal
rules, and moral obligations demand that parents take care of
the child until it is fully grown. These responsibilities are lifetransforming. Moreover, in our society these responsibilities fall
asymmetrically on women and men: that is to say, they fall more
heavily on mothers than on fathers. Women still bear the most
significant share of responsibility for child care; women have
traditionally been and still are expected to subordinate their interests and ambitions for the purpose of raising children. They,
and not men, are far more likely to be blamed for shirking the
responsibilities of raising children or failing to care for them. So78.

83 U.S. 130. 141 (1873).
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ciety places shame and stigma on women who surrender their
children for adoption. Such women are regarded as failures as
mothers, not because they failed in their biological ability to give
birth, but because they failed at the social role of caring for their
children, which is the social meaning of motherhood. It is one
thing if women freely choose to become mothers, assume the
physical burdens and risks of pregnancy and childbirth, and take
on the various social roles and expectations of motherhood in
our society. It is quite another when the state forces them against
their will to undergo these physical strains and dangers and to
take on these life-altering responsibilities and obligations. Then
it denies them their liberty in the most profound way.
The asymmetrical expectations about responsibility for parenting that our society places on men and women are part of a
larger structure of sex role differentiation, and part of a larger
system of economic and status relations between men and
women that reproduces and maintains inequality between men
and women both within families and across society. As noted
above, historically the inequality of women in society has been
achieved through laws, institutions and practices that either push
or require women to devote themselves primarily to traditional
uncompensated gendered roles as caregivers while making
women dependent on the economic support of men or the state.
Laws that force women to become mothers against their will
help maintain the unequal and subordinate status of women in
society because they help commit women, against their will, to
lives of domestic labor and economic dependency. Because
criminalization of abortion helps place women in a socially dependent status and keep them there, such laws constitute class
legislation. They force women either to devote themselves to
traditional roles and responsibilities of childcare that lack both
status and economic remuneration or else suffer the stigma and
shame of admitting their inability to care for their own children
by placing them up for adoption. Thus, they employ basic social
expectations about the duties and responsibilities of motherhood
as a lever to pressure women into traditional roles of child care
and economic dependency. They make it more difficult for
women to aspire to opportunities in the public world of work
that are inconsistent with being the primary caregiver of a child
(or a number of children). They push more women into lowstatus occupations and conditions of economic dependence and
help keep them there. As a result, these laws deny women a significant choice in the direction of their lives, as well as control
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over their bodies. Because criminalization of abortion reinforces
women's subordinate status in society, it denies them the equal
citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The argument I have just presented reasons about abortion
quite differently from the Supreme Court's sex equality jurisprudence. That jurisprudence asks whether or not there is classification that makes distinctions based on sex and then asks
whether the classification is closely tailored to a sufficiently important public interest, or is the relic of outmoded stereotypes
79
about men and women. Laws that discriminate against pregnant women are not even treated as sex discrimination;80 laws
that formally distinguish between men and women but are justified on women's ability to become pregnant are generally upheld
81
based on natural or biological differences between the sexes.
Finally, laws that impose disproportionate burdens on women
are constitutional unless it can be demonstrated that the burdens
82
were imposed because of a desire to harm women. Under these
doctrines, abortion is simply not a question of sex equality; first,
because it is directed at pregnant women; second, because even
if it were a question of sex equality, pregnancy is a sufficient reason to treat women differently from men; and third, because it is
difficult to prove that states have criminalized abortion out of a
secret animus toward women.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's doctrines are merely attempts to instantiate and apply the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantees of equal citizenship; they are not the guarantees
themselves. The fact that these doctrines fail utterly to recognize
that abortion implicates questions of women's rights or women's
equality is not a reason to think that abortion in unrelated to
these concerns; rather, it is a reason to think that the existing
doctrine underprotects the equal citizenship of women that is
guaranteed by the constitutional text.
My argument also differs from existing doctrinal structures
in that it combines elements of liberty and equality: Criminalization of abortion limits women's liberty because it denies them
the liberty to choose whether or not to become mothers, and be79. United States v. Virginia. 518 U.S. 515 (1996): Craig v. Boren. 429 U.S. 190
(1976).
80. Geduldig v. Alleio. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Bw see Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v.
Hibbs. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
81. Nguyen v. INS. 533 U.S. 53 (2001): Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma
County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
82. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
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cause it requires women to adopt life-altering obligations that
will place them in conditions of economic and social dependence. It limits equality because it imposes special obligations on
women to surrender their bodies to bear children, and because
by withdrawing their choice whether or not to become mothers it
helps place women in conditions of social and economic dependency, which helps maintain their subordinate status as citizens.
Thus it limits their liberty profoundly and it is also class legislation that violates the equal citizenship principle.
This interconnection between liberty and equality is not
surprising, because the two ideas are intertwined in the principles that underlie the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. To
take only one example, the Privileges or Immunities Clause, as
originally conceived, was both about liberty and equality. It did
not treat tort, contract, and property rights as fundamental rights
(in our modern sense) so that all state regulation of tort, contract
and property rights would be regarded as immediately suspect.
Rather, it allowed reasonable regulation of basic civil rights of
tort, contract and property as long as it was within the state's po83
lice power, and not class legislation.
After Emancipation, Southern States passed the infamous
Black Codes that denied blacks almost all of their civil rights and
sought to return them to a legal state little better than slavery.
These Black Codes were a major impetus to the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment. To use Jed
Rubenfeld's expression, the Black Codes were the "paradigm

83. That is why the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized the 1866 Civil
Rights Bill. which required that blacks enjoy the same contract. tort and property rights
as enjoyed by white citizens. See also AMAR, supra note 62. at 178-79 (suggesting a distinction between full protection for fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights and protection against unreasonable discrimination in common law rights). Some scholars have contended that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is only a guarantee of equality among
citizens. See Harrison. supra note 59, 1387-88; CURRIE. supra note 59, at 342-51. See also
NELSON. supra note 30, at 115-18, 123 (evidence is inconclusive as to whether section
one guaranteed substantive liberties as well as equal regulation of liberty). But I believe
the better argument is that the Privileges or Immunities Clause also imposes substantive
protections against state regulation; for example, the guarantees contained in the Bill of
Rights. See, e.g.. AMAR, supra note 62, at 174-97; CURTIS. supra note 62. at 71-83: Curtis.
Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause. supra note 50, at 56--{)5. As noted
above. Senator Howard's statement introducing the Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate argued that protecting basic rights of citizenship- including the individual rights provisions of the Bill of Rights- was in fact one of the key purposes of the clause. CONG.
GLOBE. 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard) ("'The great object
of the first section of this amendment is ... to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these great fundamental guarantees."). See supra text accompanying notes 44-59.
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case" of class legislation.84 What made the Black Codes class legislation was not simply that they restricted common law rights,
but that they severely restricted them for blacks but not for
whites. Denying liberty unequally is a pretty standard method of
subordinating a group and keeping persons in that group in their
place.
Over the years we have erected a doctrinal structure that
tries (unsuccessfully in many cases) to disaggregate questions of
liberty (currently treated under the Due Process Clause and the
fundamental rights branch of the Equal Protection Clause) from
equality (currently treated under the suspect classification
branch of the Equal Protection Clause). But the interconnections between liberty and equality remain. The Supreme Court's
reformulation of Roe v. Wade in Planned Parenthood of South5
eastern Pennsylvania v. Case/ is nominally concerned with a
question of liberty-whether the state has placed an undue burden on the right to abortion. But the basis of that liberty is a
concern about equality-the equal status of women in society.
The Court's 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas 86 was also based
on the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. But the
Court's opinion referred to dignitary concerns that we would
normally associate with values of equality and equal citizenship.87
We might think of both Lawrence (decided under the Due Process Clause) and the earlier case of Romer v. Evans88 (decided
under the Equal Protection Clause) as concerned with whether
the laws challenged in these cases constituted class legislation
designed to subordinate homosexuals, keep them in their places,
and treat them both as outlaws and as beyond the protection of
the law.
I have argued that laws that criminalize abortion are class
and subordinating legislation that helps maintain second-class
citizenship for women. But I do not argue that the mere existence of an abortion right fully secures women's equal citizenship. Robin West has pointed out that if "[m]othering children,
as we presently construct this work is incompatible with the basic
rights and responsibilities of citizenship,"s9 then giving women a
84. ]ED RUBENFELD. FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
SELF-GOVERNMENT (2000): lED RUBENFELD. REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY (2006).

505 u.s. 833 (1992).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
See id. at 567. 575-76. Justice O'Connor's concurrence is specifically based on
the idea of equality. /d. at 579 (O"Connor.J .. concurring in the judgment).
88. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
89. Robin West. Concurring in the Judgment. in WHAT ROE v. WADE SHOULD
85.
86.
87.
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right to choose abortions does not cure the larger structural
problem. We cannot simply say that because a women could
have had an abortion, she therefore has no right to complain
about the way in which family and work structures help relegate
women to conditions of economic and social dependency. The
abortion right, West concludes, is at best "a pathetically inade90
quate remedy" for a much larger problem, and constitutionally
conscientious legislatures should try to assist mothers, equalize
burdens and reform the workplace to help secure women's practical equality with men. Indeed, by easing the burdens on
women, legislatures may make abortions less frequent and protect the interests and lives of children, both before and after
birth, more effectively.
V. ABORTION AND THE PRIVILEGES OR
IMMUNITIES OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP
A second location for the constitutional right to abortion
might be the Privileges or Immunities Clause. As Senator Howard noted, that clause guarantees those "fundamental rights and
liberties which belong to every citizen of the United States and
91
to all persons who happen to be within their jurisdiction." The
Congress that drafted the Fourteenth Amendment understood
that the list of such fundamental rights "cannot be fully defined
in their entire extent and precise nature," 92 so that it is no objection that some of them are not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution. The language of and principles underlying the
Privileges or Immunities Clause are a far better source of the
right to abortion (and other fundamental rights) than the Due
Process Clause (where courts currently locate them), and for a
fairly simple reason: the Privileges and Immunities Clause was
intended to serve precisely that function. Instead of asking
whether an interest is a fundamental right or protected liberty
under the Due Process Clause, the more natural and sensible
question is whether it is a privilege or immunity that all citizens
enjoy.
The argument for a constitutional right to abortion under
the Privileges or Immunities Clause is quite similar to the argument I have just offered under the Equal Protection Clause.
HAVE SAID, supra note 3. at 141.
90.

/d.

91.
92.

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Congress. 1st session. at 2766 (remarks of Sen. Howard).
/d. at 2765.
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First, women have a right to protect their bodily integrity; when
the state bans abortion, it forces women to bear children even
when it would endanger their life and their health. Second,
women have a right to decide whether they wish to become parents and assume the duties and responsibilities of parenthood.
These are life-changing obligations that completely transform a
woman's life and prospects and may commit her to years of child
care and increased social and economic dependency. The state
may not force individuals to assume such life-altering obligations
against their will. When the state bans abortion, it forces women
to become mothers-with all the attendant social expectations
and responsibilities-or else give up sexual intercourse (because
contraception is not always effective). Because the state may not
force people to become parents against their will, it may not put
women to this choice.
The argument from the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
however is more complicated than the argument from the Equal
Protection Clause. The Privileges or Immunities Clause is declaratory-its language does not specify the rights it protects but
merely asserts their existence. 93 The framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment assumed that there were rights preexisting government that all citizens enjoyed; the job of the federal government
and the states was to protect these rights from infringement. Until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the argument
went, the federal government had no power to protect these
94
rights from state infringement except in very limited settings.
After the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment the courts
(through interpretation of section 1) and Congress (through its
enforcement powers under section 5) would have the ability and
the duty to do so.
When Congress passes legislation to protect the privileges
or immunities of national citizenship, it can announce that, in its
93. On the declaratory ideas behind the Fourteenth Amendment and the ideas of
declaratory theories generally, see AMAR, supra note 62. at 147-56.
94. See CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st session. at 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Bingham) (new Fourteenth Amendment gives federal government the power "to protect
by national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the
inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be abridged
or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State"). Bingham argued that the Amendment "takes from no state any right that ever pertained to it." because "(n]o State ever
had the right ... to deny any freeman the equal protection of the laws or to abridge the
privileges or immunities of any citizen of the Republic. although many of them have assumed and exercised that power. and that without remedy." !d. That is. Bingham's view
was that the Fourteenth Amendment gave power to protect the rights that citizens already had.
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view, these rights belong to all citizens. (To be sure. that is not
how the Supreme Court currently understands the operation of
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that is in part
because the Court's understanding of the text and principles behind the Fourteenth Amendment is not very good.t And when
individuals or social movements interpret the Constitution in
pressing for social change, they can make arguments that certain
rights heretofore unrecognized or insufficiently protected are
fundamental guarantees of citizenship that deserve special protection. When a court seeks to protect declaratory rights, however, it must do something in addition to making substantive arguments for why the rights are important; it needs evidence that
the rights in question have achieved a special status as fundamental. If the rights are specifically mentioned in the text, or can
easily be implied from specific references in the text, the task is
far easier. But if not, then courts need another way to establish
that the rights already exist and deserve judicial protection. One
way to do this-although not the only way-is to look at the
kinds of rights that have historically or traditionally been protected by states. or rights that almost all of the states have recognized or protected. The idea is that when lots of different majorities agree that these rights deserve protection, they are more
likely to be rights with special constitutional value that all governments are supposed to protect. That is, they become the (expected) privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.
The list of such rights might change over time as social and political movements mobilize to protect rights and convince their
fellow citizens that these rights are indeed important, even if
previous generations had not felt particularly endangered or upset by their lack of protection.%
There is nothing particularly strange or unusual about a dynamic conception of declaratory rights. People press for rights
when they begin to feel aggrieved by their absence, and their aggrievement does not come all at once, but is triggered by new
problems and changed circumstances. ~ Then people press for
7

95. For a discussion based on the history surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. see Michael W. McConnell. lnstitlltions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores. 111 HARV. L. REV. 153. 182-83 (1997).
96. For a discussion of how social movements draw on existing materials to fashion
rights claims. see Jim Pope. The Role of Social Movements in Constitutional Interpretation and Enforcement (Aug. 2007) (unpublished manuscript on file with author and Constitutional Commentarv).
97. See Reva B. ·Siegel. Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social
Movement Perspective. 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297. 340-45 (2001) (noting how suffragists re-
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protection of these rights, arguing that governments always
should have protected them, whether or not this was in fact the
case and whether or not the claim even made sense in an earlier
era. Thus, a declaratory conception of rights is almost always a
dynamic conception which uses history and tradition as a powerful justificatory rhetoric. Rights become fundamental and timeless, in short, when the time is right for them.
Under this approach, it is not difficult to understand why
the right to use contraceptives, first recognized in Griswold v.
Connecticur in 1965, and extended in Eisenstadt v. Baircr and
Carey v. Population Services International,J(YJ would qualify as a
privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States, not only
for legislatures, but for courts as well. A social movement for
contraceptive rights had been ongoing throughout most of the
twentieth century, and had eventually convinced most of the
country, as evidenced by almost universal decriminalization. By
1965 when Griswold was decided, only one state, Connecticut,
still outlawed the use of contraceptives, and the law was only fitfully enforced.
This approach to privileges and immunities sees the scope
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as dynamic, depending on
the emerging customs, expectations and traditions of the American people as a whole. The clause's "declaratory" nature invites
individuals throughout the country to press for reforms at the
state, local, and national levels to protect rights that they believe
are due to them as citizens and to explain to and convince their
fellow citizens why these rights are so important. When enough
people around the country have been convinced, and enough legal protections have spread throughout the country, federal
courts are entitled to pronounce that these rights have become
expected and customary rights of American citizens, and therefore should be binding on the small remainder of the states that
have become outliers. Rights become privileges and immunities
of citizenship as a result of a period of constitutional politics in
which the people speak through protest and discussion and legal
reform, arguing that certain rights are important basic protections of American citizenship and winning over a large number
of people to their views. At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, people understood that these rights included
framed
98.
99.
100.

arguments as constitutional claims given the particular problems they faced).
381 u.s. 479 (1965).
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
431 u.s. 678 (1977).
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basic access to the legal system and basic rights to make contracts and own property. The recognition that all human beings
have a right to their liberty, and to the ownership of their labor
was the result of a long debate over human rights in the antebellum period, bringing together Jacksonian, free soil, and antislav101
ery ideas among others. That is why the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment believed that the Black Codes were
inconsistent with American citizenship. But as times change, and
through sustained contestation by social and political movements and their opponents, new privileges and immunities can
enter the Pantheon of American citizenship. The Privileges or
Immunities Clause protects unenumerated rights whose pedigree
is established elsewhere in the political system-through sustained argument, debate, and political activity.
This approach to privileges and immunities of citizenship
makes sense of much of the Court's "substantive due process"
doctrines, which developed after the Court improperly truncated
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. These doctrines developed
in response to social and political demands for rights over a sustained period of time that drew on existing traditions of practice,
or that eventually convinced large numbers of people in many
different parts of the country. As the sexual revolution proceeded, more and more people assumed that basic elements of
sexual autonomy were guarantees of citizenship. As we have
seen, this approach makes sense of Griswold v. Connecticut. In
1987 Judge Robert Bork's confirmation to the Supreme Court
failed in part because he refused to accept that the decision in
102
Griswold protected a basic right of American citizens. By the
time Justice Samuel Alito was confirmed to the Supreme Court
in 2006, it was quite clear that support for Griswold was part of
the "constitutional catechism" that all Justices had to recite in

101. NELSON. supra note 30, at 13-40. 64-90: WILLIAM M. WIECEK. THE SOURCES
OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 1760-1848. at 190-93. 206-07. 21820. 274-75 (1977); HAROLD M. HYMAN. A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION 435-36,438-40 (1973): ERIC
FONER. FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR. FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 73-99 (1970). See also JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL
UNDER LAW 51-55. 66-93, 117-20 (1965): JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 62-64. 77 (1983):
CURTIS. supra note 62. at 42-56; ROBIN WEST. PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM:
RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 20-30 (1994).
102. At the very least. Bork's opponents believed that his opposition to Griswold
helped undermine his case. See Lackland H. Bloom. Twenty Fifth Anniversary of Griswold v. Connecticut and the Right to Privacy: The Legacy of Griswold. 16 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 511. 542-43 (1989).
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order to be confirmed. 101 The declaratory theory of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause also makes sense of the Court's 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas.l().j By 2003, only thirteen states criminalized same-sex sodomy, and the law was almost never enforced in criminal prosecutions. Instead, it was used to deny
homosexuals rights to employment, adoption, and other civil
privileges. 105 As a result, it also acted as a contemporary form of
class legislation that singled out a group and declared its expressions of love and intimacy criminal. A sustained social movement for reform changed public attitudes and made heterosexuals recognize that homosexuals were individuals who were
equally citizens and therefore deserved the same rights of sexual
intimacy that they had long enjoyed. This changed the social
meaning of sodomy laws and hence their constitutional meaning
with respect to the principles underlying the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. This analysis also shows why the issue presented in Lawrence presented a more difficult case for courts in
10
1986 when Bowers v. Hardwick " was decided. In 1986, only half
of the country had abolished its same-sex sodomy laws, although
107
the trend was toward decriminalization.
Abortion rights, however, present a more complicated story.
The Supreme Court decided Roe before most states had recognized abortion rights. In 1960, all states criminalized abortion
with very few exceptions. In the next decade, however, in part
because of the sexual revolution and the second wave of American feminism, attitudes toward abortion changed dramatically,
and by 1972 a significant majority of Americans-including
American Catholics- believed that the question of abortion
should be left to the woman and her doctor. Hli' At the same time
a wide range of prominent organizations-ranging from the
AMA to the YMCA to the ABA to a Presidential Commission-called for reform of the nation's abortion laws. 10'1 Nevertheless, by January 1973, when Roe was decided, only thirteen
103. Jack M. Balkin. The Constitutional Catechism. Balkinization. http://balkin.
logspot.com/2006/ 01/constitutional-catechism.html (Last visited June 26. 2006).
104. 539 u.s. 558 (2003).
105. See id. at 572.
106. 478 u.s. 186 (1986).
107. See Lawrence. 539 U.S. at 572.
108. See DAVID J. GARROW. LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 539 (1994) (noting a January 1972 Gallup poll stating that fifty seven percent of Americans. and fifty four percent of American Catholics.
agreed that the abortion decision should be left to a woman and her doctor).
109. GERALD ROSENBERG. THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 184 (1991).
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states had passed abortion reform statutes, which gave doctors
more leeway to perform abortions in cases where life or health
was threatened, and only four states had passed abortion repeal
statutes that left the decision up to the woman and her doctor in
110
the first half of pregnancy. State laws on the books had not
caught up with the direction of public opinion. Thus, when Roe
was decided, the Court imposed constitutional rules that had
been adopted by only four states out of fifty. In 1973, when Roe
was decided, the right to abortion was not a privilege or immunity of national citizenship, at least under the declaratory theory.
It is possible that a wave of abortion repeal statutes might
have swept the country in the 1970's, but we will never know because the Supreme Court interrupted the trend. Both David
Garrow and Gene Burns have argued, to the contrary, that the
pro-life movement was rapidly gathering steam even before Roe
and might have stopped or at least greatl~ slowed the pro-choice
movement's advance in state legislatures. 11
When the Court decided Roe in 1973. the right to abortion
had not yet gained the status of a privilege or immunity of national citizenship, at least as judged by the pace of abortion reform legislation. A different question is whether it has become
one in the past thirty years. If Roe v. Wade were overruled today. it is likely that an overwhelming majority of the states
would protect some kind of right to abortion-perhaBs less than
1 2
twelve would outlaw abortion in virtually every case. And public opinion polls regularly show strong public resistance to overturning Roe v. Wade. 113 That suggests that most of the public now
110. /d. at 184. Rachel Benson Gold. Lessons From Before Roe: Will Past Be Prologue?. THE GCTTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY. Mar. 2003. at 8. available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/06/1/gr060108.html.
111. GE~E BL'R~S. THE MORAL VETO: FRAMING CONTRACEPTION. ABORTION
A~D CCLTURAL PLURALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 214-228 (2005) (shift from medical
frame to moral frame. exacerbated by associations between abortion and the feminist
movement. limited the success of abortion repeal statutes by the early 1970s): David
Garrow. Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical Perspective. 62 ALB. L.
REV. 833.840-41 (1999) (arguing that the 1970 New York liberalization law. and not Roe
v. Wade. energized the right-to-life movement).
112. Both pro-life and pro-choice groups. for different reasons. have incentives to
maximize the number. Shortly before the 2004 elections. the Center for Reproductive
Rights estimated that 21 states might outlaw abortion if Roe v. Wade were overturned.
ERICA SMOCK. CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS. WHAT IF ROE FELL? (2004),
http://www .crlp.orgipdflbo_whatifroe fe II. pdf.
113. In a CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll. taken from Jan. 20-22. 2006, 66 percent of
the public opposed overturning Roe v. Wade. up from 63 percent in a poll taken from
Julv 7-10. 2005. See PollingReport.com: An independent. nonpartisan resource on trends
in American public opinion. http://www.pollingreport.com/abortion.htm (last visited June
19.2006).
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regards a basic abortion right as among the guarantees of citizenship. But if so, critics might respond, it is in part because of
the Court's bootstrapping, making the right to abortion the legal
status quo and thereby acclimating the country to it. We cannot
be sure how much of current public acceptance of abortion rights
is due to the Court's early decision and how much is due to the
success of social movement activism that changed the minds of
most Americans throughout the country.
One might respond, however, that in the case of a controversial opinion like Roe, this ''bootstrapping" effect is greatly
exaggerated. Political scientists have long pointed out that the
Court does not oppose popular majorities over a sustained pe114
riod, particularly on controversial subjects like abortion. Despite over thirty years of pro-life mobilization, the political
dominance of the Republicans as a pro-life party, the election of
several pro-life presidents, and decades of Republican judicial
appointments, the basic right to abortion is still standing. Instead
of being completely overturned, the original Roe decision was
cut back in the Casey compromise, a compromise which, not at
all coincidentally, also better reflected public opinion.
Although one might argue that the decision in Roe unfairly
helped foster public support for abortion rights, it is equally possible, perhaps even likely, that the Court's early decision actually
hardened and increased public opposition to abortion. The
Court's decision in Roe galvanized an already emerging right-tolife movement and gave it a highly visible target for populist reaction. Political entrepreneurs saw that they could form new coalitions of groups previously at odds organized around a common
opposition to abortion rights. 115 If the Court had proceeded more
slowly, and articulated the scope of the right only over many

114. The canonical statement is Robert A. Dahl. Decision-Making in a Democracy:
The Supreme Court as a Na1ional Policy-Maker. 6 1. PUB. L. 279. 285 (1957). who noted
that "the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States." id. For later
versions. see Balkin & Levinson. supra note 26. at 1060. TERI JENNINGS PEREITI. IN
DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 80-132 (1999). Mark Graber's gloss on Dahl suggests
that abortion may be an issue where many politicians are more than willing to blame the
Court and make it take the political heat in order to preserve majority status. See Mark
A. Graber. The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary. 7
STUD. AM. POL. DEY. 35. 36 (1993) ("[J]ustices ... declare state and federal practices
unconstitutional only when the dominant national coalition is unable or unwilling to settle some public dispute ... [and] prominent elected officials consciously invite the judiciary to resolve those political controversies that they cannot or would not address.").
115. Robert C. Post and Reva Siegel. Roe Rage: Democratic Constitwionalism and
Backlash. 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
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years, it would not necessarily have forestalled the growth of a
powerful pro-life movement, but it might have helped produce a
political compromise that better meshed with developing trends
in public opinion. Possibly the Court's early intervention caused
both types of effects with respect to different parts of the population. Some people came to accept abortion rights because the
Court protected them, while others came to oppose them for the
very same reason.
In sum, even if the right to abortion was not a privilege or
immunity of citizenship in 1973, we can make a far stronger case
for it thirty years later. First, there is a strong substantive argument for why abortion rights are basic rights of citizenship,
which shares much in common with the argument under the
Equal Protection Clause. Second, there is also a very strong case
that contraceptive rights are protected under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Finally, there is the public's stated desire not
to have Roe overturned. Together, these elements help make the
case for protecting abortion rights today under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. That is not a necessary conclusion-abortion
rights are already guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clausebut this interpretation would harmonize ideas behind the two
clauses. If criminalizing abortion prevents women from enjoying
full and equal citizenship, then it would seem to follow that a
right to abortion is necessary (albeit not sufficient) for women to
enjoy equal citizenship. But if a right is necessary to enjoy equal
citizenship, then it must be a basic right of citizenship and so, in
the long run at least, it should eventually be protected under the
declaratory model of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE UNBORN
The case for a right to abortion is hardly complete. We must
still consider whether the unborn have their own constitutional
rights that trump those of the mother. Are the unborn, throughout their development, from fertilized ovum to unimplanted
blastocyst to embryo to fetus, persons within the meaning of the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses? As Justice Blackmun pointed out in Roe itself, if the unborn are constitutional
persons, the argument for a constitutional right to abortion collapses.116 Indeed, as I shall point out in a moment, states might be

116.

Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113.156 (1973).
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constitutionally prohibited from permitting abortions under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
None of the Justices in Roe v. Wade-whether in the majority or the dissent-maintained that the unborn are constitutional
persons. 117 In fact, none of the Justices in all of the abortion cases
since Roe v. Wade-no matter how opposed to recognizing a
constitutional right to abortion- has ever contested Roe's hold11
ing about the personhood of the unborn. R
The word "person" means now what it meant in 1868-an
119
individual human being. A fertilized ovum has human DNA
and, if it implants and is not miscarried, will eventually grow into
a human being who is an individual. But the fertilized ovum is
not yet an individual. Although the text of the Constitution refers to the word "person" at several points, by and large these
references do not make sense when applied to fertilized ova,
blastocysts, embryos or fetuses. For example, immediately before the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Constitution states that "[n)o person ... shall be compelled in any crimi120
nal case to be a witness against himself." It is hard to see how a
fetus could be compelled to testify against anyone, much less
against itself.
117. See id. at 177 (Rehnquist. J .. dissenting) ("The only conclusion possible from
this history is that the drafters did not intend to have the Fourteenth Amendment withdraw from the States the power to legislate with respect to this matter."): see also Doe v.
Bolton. 410 U.S. 179, 222 (White. J.. dissenting) ("This issue, for the most part. should be
left with the people and to the political processes the people have devised to govern their
affairs.").
118. Instead they have argued that the issue of abortion should be left to the political
process. a position that is inconsistent with constitutional personhood for the unborn and
with a constitutional right to abortion. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 505 U.S. 833. 979 (1992) (Scalia. J .. dissenting. joined by Rehnquist, C.J..
and White and Thomas. JJ.) ("The States may. if they wish. permit abortion on demand.
but the Constitution does not require them to do so. The permissibility of abortion. and
the limitations upon it. are to be resolved like most important questions in our democracy: by citizens trying to persuade one another and then voting."): id. at 982 (''The
whole argument of abortion opponents is that what the Court calls the fetus and what
others call the unborn child is a human life .... There is. of course. no way to determine
that as a legal matter; it is. in fact. a value judgment.").
119. 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 597 (2d. ed. 1989) ("An individual human
being: a man woman or child. (In earliest use. the human being acting in some capacity.
personal agent or actor. person concerned.)''); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1686 {1993) ("'an individual
human being.").
There is also a specifically legal definition of "person" which. in this context. is almost perfectly circular: "A human being (actual person) or body corporate (artificial person) having rights and duties recognized by law." 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY at
597. The question in this case. of course. is whether the embrvo or fetus has constitutional rights recognized at law.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Nor does the text of the Fourteenth Amendment compel
the view that embryos or fetuses are persons. The first clause
says that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside." Does this mean that
there are "persons" who are not born and who are therefore not
eligible to be citizens? Or, more plausibly, does the amendment
simply assume that all persons are born somewhere, and that
those born in the United States (or who are subsequently naturalized) are citizens? Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
written at the same time as Section 1, says that "Representatives
shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed." 121 This language does
not suggest that embryos and fetuses would count for purposes
of enumeration. 122 As discussed above, the key principle underlying the text of Fourteenth Amendment is the principle of civil
equality-all persons are equal under the law-born equal, we
might say-and therefore enjoy basic rights accorded to all free
persons. Hence the state may not discriminate against them due
the circumstances of their birth, for example, that they were
born black or white, male or female, rich or poor. Important as
this principle is, it says nothing about the unborn. 123
The original expected application of the Fourteenth
Amendment is not by itself controlling; it is merely evidence of
how to apply original meaning. But it also points against recognizing fetuses as persons. The common law distinguished between abortions before and after quickening- the point when a
fetus's movements could be felt by a pregnant woman, usually
between the fourth and fifth month. Abortion was a felony after

121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ 2.
122. Justice Blackmun added in Roe that "[w)e are not aware that in the taking of
any census under [the Apportionment Clause of Article I. Section 2]. a fetus has ever
been counted." 410 U.S. at 157 n.53.
123. The argument is not by itself conclusive. Corporations are persons under the
Fourteenth Amendment. but they are not counted for purposes of the census. See Akhil
Reed Amar. /ntratextualism. 112 HARV. L. REV. 747. 775 (1999). What reinforces the
textual argument made above are the legal consequences of holding that fertilized ova.
embryos. blastocysts and fetuses have the same rights as born persons. As discussed infra.
this would mean that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses should apply with
equal force. The alternative and. I think. better view is that although the unborn are not
themselves constitutional persons. the state has important interests in their potential to
become persons. as well as interests in the value of life in general; under this interpretation states could treat the unborn differently than born persons without running afoul of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
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124

quickening, but not before. This distinction would make little
sense if the unborn were persons from the moment of conception; there is no good justification for imposing lesser penalties
(or no penalties at all) for ending the life of human beings too
young to kick. Around the time of the Civil War, many states
were in the process of changing their abortion laws to criminalize
abortions thro~¥hout the p~egnancy_, and by 1868 most states
had such laws.· But there IS no evidence that the framers or
adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to enact a principle that would alter common law views about the unborn.
Moreover, some of the abortion statutes passed during this period-like the Texas statute at issue in Roe v. Wade, enacted in
185412" -criminalized abortions performed on women but did not
punish women who self-aborted. This treatment of the unborn,
too, would make little sense if the unborn were regarded as persons. (It would, however, make some sense if the point of abortion laws was to protect women from botched abortions by incompetent doctors).
Finally, arguments from consequences support the arguments from text and history. If the unborn are persons, they are
entitled to equal protection of the laws. Abortion then becomes
the premeditated killing of a person. This would not leave abortion regulation to individual states, as some critics of Roe have
advocated. Rather, it would prohibit virtually all abortions except those necessary to save the mother's life. 127 States would
have to treat abortions the same way they treat other premeditated killings. At least where death or serious bodily harm to the
mother is not at risk, there is a fairly strong argument that criminal laws that criminalize ending the life of born persons- but not

124. See Roe. 410 U.S. at 132-36 and sources cited at nn. 20--28.
125. Roe. 410 U.S. at 175 (Rehnquist. J.. dissenting).
126. Texas Laws 1854. c. 49 § 1. set forth in 3 Gammel. Laws of Texas. 1502 (1898).
The statute was modified into what is essentially the present statute in 1857. See Texas
Penal Code of 1857. Arts. 531-536: Paschal's Laws of Texas. Arts. 2192-97 (1866); Texas
Rev. Stat. Arts. 536-41 (1879): Texas Rev. Crim. Stat.. Arts. 1071-76 (1911).
127. The issue is even more complicated than this. States can certainly allow for selfdefense. even against so-called "innocent attackers" who don't realize the threat they
pose to others. But criminal law usually requires a reasonable belief in imminent death or
serious bodily harm before a person may use deadly force. Applying the imminence
standard in the case of abortion might mean waiting until it was absolutely necessary to
perform the procedure. when the fetus was well along in its development. As a result.
doctors might be tempted to exaggerate the imminence requirement in order to permit
the abortion earlier. But if so. procedural due process should require that the embryo or
fetus be entitled to a judicial hearing represented by counsel for the fetus before abortions to save the mother's life would be permitted.
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"persons" in utero-would violate "equal protection of the laws"
in the most literal sense.
Some states in the pre-Roe era (like Georgia, which adopted
the Model Penal Code) allowed abortions in cases of rape or incest. But if the unborn are persons under the meaning of the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, it would be very difficult to justify exempting a person's murder from criminal punishment merely because the victim's life arose out of coerced sex or
an incestuous union. Even before Roe states generally did not
punish abortion as severely as they did murder, some did not punish abortion at all before a certain point in the pregnancy, and
some, like Texas, did not punish the mother but only the doctor
who performed the abortion. All these laws would be constitutionally suspect if the unborn are persons guaranteed the equal
protection of the laws. It might also become difficult to explain
why fertility clinics could discard unused embryos left over from
in vitro fertilization processes, even with the biological parents'
permission. Normally, parents who order their born children be
destroyed by third parties can be prosecuted for murder.
The Constitution does not require that all murder be treated
the same. States can punish negligent homicide and murder committed in the heat of passion less severely than other forms of
murder. But abortion involves a premeditated act with the specific
intent of ending the life of the embryo or fetus. Premeditated
homicide is the most severely punished in virtually all jurisdictions. To be sure, some people do believe that abortion is nothing
more than cold-blooded murder. But most Americans-even
those with moral qualms about abortion-do not agree. For example, they may want to punish the doctor but not the mother,
even though it is the mother who seeks and pays for the abortion.
That is a very different attitude from the one they would have toward a person who pays for a contract killer. They think there is a
difference-in terms of who should be punished and what the
punishment should be-between a woman who has a first-term
abortion and a person who commits first-degree murder. We
should not interpret the Constitution to forbid that distinction.
VII. THE TWO RIGHTS TO ABORTION
Nothing I have said so far tells us how the right to abortion
should be enforced, or how courts should accommodate the
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state's interests in protecting potential human life. If there is a
constitutional right to abortion, it hardly follows that it can be
exercised with equal freedom at any point in the pregnancy.
Courts must create judicial constructions if they want to implement the constitutional right. Reasonable people can disagree
about the best way to do this. The Supreme Court's original attempt in Roe-the trimester system-drew considerable criticism for being legislative and ad hoc. In this section I try to offer
an alterative approach that is more closely connected to the reasons why the right to abortion deserves constitutional protection.
I believe that my approach would have been better if adopted
initially. However, the Court's decision in Casey, which rejected
the trimester system, moved the doctrine toward an alternative
construction that, while imperfect, is more acceptable.
When the Court first announced the right to abortion in Roe
v. Wade/ 29 it offered a fairly complicated trimester formula: In
the first trimester, "the abortion decision and its effectuation
must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's
attending physician." 00 In the second trimester, "the State ...
may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that
are reasonably related to maternal health."m The second trimester, the Court explained, ended roughly at the point of viability,
the point at which the fetus is "potentially able to live outside
the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid. " 132 After viability,
and throughout the third trimester, the State's interest in potential human life becomes sufficiently compelling that "the
State ... may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abor-

128. In his response to this article. Mitch Berman points out that even if the right to
abortion is consistent with the Constitution's original meaning. and even if the unborn
are not persons with their own independent constitutional rights. states might still legally
prohibit abortions (except perhaps those necessary to save a woman's life) if they could
show that (1) protection of unborn life is a compelling state interest from the moment of
conception and (2) preventing all abortions is narrowly tailored to vindicate that interest.
Mitchell N. Berman. Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus A Thought Or Two About
Abortion). 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383 (2007). I have tried to demonstrate why states cannot successfully make this showing in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra
note 3. at 47-52. and I offer another version of the argument in Balkin, supra note 4. at
522-27. My goal here is more modest: to show that the constitutional right to abortion is
consistent with the Constitution's original meaning. The argument that follows assumes
that although states cannot ban all abortions. they nevertheless have important interests
in unborn life that would justify banning at least some abortions.
129. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
130. 410 U.S. at 164.
131. /d.
132. /d. at 160.
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tion except where it i~ necessary.' in appropriate medical ju~¥
ment, for the preservatiOn of the hfe or health of the mother."·
The joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
34
Pennsylvania v. Case/ jettisoned Roe's trimester system, and
substituted its own doctrinal framework, now dividing the term of
pregnancy into two parts: Before viability states could adopt
measures designed "to persuade the woman to choose childbirth
over abortion," or to promote maternal health, as long as they did
not impose an "undue burden" on the woman's ability to obtain
an abortion. After viability, states could "regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
135
mother."
Note that in both Roe and Casey, viability marks the
boundary between the time before which states may regulate
abortion only in limited ways and the time after which they may
almost completely prohibit it. Nevertheless, in both Roe and Casey the Court insisted that states must allow abortions after viability when they are necessary to preserve the mother's life or
health. Although the Court did not say this directly, it follows
that abortions must also be available before viability when necessary to preserve the mother's life or health.
More than a few critics have suggested that the complex formulas in Roe and Casey would have been more appropriate coming from legislatures than courts. One reason for that complexity
is that the Court views the question in terms of time. In doing so,
it conflates two different rights to abortion that women might exercise for different reasons. This becomes clear if we break the
Roe and Casey formulas down into their component parts, and focus not on the time during the pregnancy when the state may
regulate in various ways, but on the reasons why a pregnant
woman seeks the abortion. Sometimes women seek abortions to
avoid a risk to their life or health. Sometimes they seek abortions
because they do not want to become the mother of a new child.
And, of course, sometimes they do so for both reasons.
To understand how courts should enforce the right to abortion, we should recognize that it is actually two rights. The first is
a woman's right not to be forced by the state to bear children at
risk to her life or health. The second is a woman's right to decide
133.
134.
135.

ld. at 165.
505 u.s. 833 (1992).
505 U.S. at 879.
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whether or not to become a mother and assume the obligations
of parenthood. When a woman becomes pregnant, the first right
is the right to protect her bodily integrity- her life and her
health. The second right is a right against state-enforced compulsory motherhood; it is the right of a woman- as opposed to the
state- to decide whether she will take on the life-altering set of
responsibilities that come with being a parent. These two rights
derive from the constitutional arguments for why criminalization
116
of abortion is class and caste legislation.
The first right to abortion is not time-limited- it continues
throughout pregnancy. Women should always have the right to
preserve their life or health when it is threatened by the continuation of a pregnancy. The second right, however, need not
continue throughout pregnancy; it requires only that women
have a reasonable time to decide whether to become mothers
and have a fair and realistic opportunity to make that choice.
The state's interest in protecting unborn life is at its strongest in
the later stages of pregnancy. But letting states vindicate this interest when it is strongest is not necessarily inconsistent with the
second right to abortion. When a woman's health and life are not
at risk, the second right requires that women have a right to a
fair and realistic opportunity to choose whether or not to become a mother, and in most cases this choice can usually be
made in the earlier stages of a pregnancy. In fact, about 88 percent of all abortions occur in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy
(roughly the end of the first trimester). Only 7 percent occur between weeks thirteen and fifteen, and only 4 percent occur between weeks sixteen and twenty. Twenty weeks is about halfway
through the average pregnancy. Only 1 percent of abortions occur after that point, and only a vanishingly small number of
abortions occur past twenty four weeks, the point of viability.m
Separating out these two rights also makes clear that courts
face different problems in articulating and protecting them. Imple136. See Jack M. Balkin ... Judgment of the Court."' in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD
HAVE SAID. supra note 3. at 41. 45 (arguing for two different rights to abortion). Recently Eugene Volokh has offered an interesting libertarian take on the two rights.
Eugene Volokh. Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment
for Organs. 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813. 1824 (2007). He believes Roe and Casey support a
more general right of individuals to engage in medical procedures necessary to protect
their lives. /d. at 1824-28. This right of medical self-defense is both broader and narrower
than what I call the first right to abortion. It is narrower because it focuses on protection
of hfe and not merely health. The right of medical self-defense is broader because it is
not specifically connected to reproductive rights, or. for that matter. to gender equality.
137. THE GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE. FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN THE
UNITED STATES (2006). www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html.
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menting the first right does not require courts to draw lines based
on the progress of the pregnancy; rather it primarily concerns how
much discretion legislatures must give doctors in determining
whether a woman faces a genuine risk to her life or health that justifies exercising the first right. In Roe and Casey the Court held that
the test was one of "appropriate medical judgment. " 138
The second right gives women a reasonable time to decide
and a fair and realistic opportunity to choose whether to become
mothers; it has proved more difficult for courts because the right
need not continue throughout pregnancy, but will give way at
some point to the state's increasingly powerful interest in protecting potential human life. What constitutes a reasonable time
and a fair and realistic opportunity to choose combines a number
of different factors. As noted above, it is surely concerned with
the relative developmental state of the fetus. But equally important, it is concerned with the question of what it is reasonable to
expect of women who are forced to make one of the most difficult and heart-rending choices in their lives. A reasonable time
to decide requires that a woman has enough time to discover
that she is pregnant, talk to people she trusts, decide what to do,
locate a physician, arrange a time to visit the physician (which
may require taking time off from work and arranging child care
for other children), make excuses or dissemble to family, friends
and employers to explain her absence, travel for the initial consultation, and then make another set of arrangements to go back
for the procedure if necessary.
The amount of time necessary may take longer for poor
women, women in rural areas, or women in states that impose a
series of procedural obstacles that effectively limit the number
abortion providers in the state or that impose waiting periods.
One might expect that states would prefer that women who
choose to have abortions carry them out as early in the pregnancy
as possible. However, abortion regulations like waiting periods
may require multiple trips to the doctor and perversely increase
the amount of time it takes to make the decision and carry it out,
139
thus causing women to seek abortions later in the pregnancy.
138. Roe. 410 U.S. at 164-165: Casey. 505 U.S. at 879.
139. The practical effect of post-Casey abortion regulations has been to protect the
right of affluent and well-connected women to choose abortions. while allowing states to
limit the effective rights of poor women. younger women. and women in rural areas because they are easiest to deter. See MELODY ROSE. SAFE. LEGAL AND UNAVAILABLE:
ABORTION POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 102-20 (2007). In effect. Casey has given
states far more leeway to compel motherhood on the poor than on the rich. This is perverse given the purposes of the second right to abortion. Precisely because these women
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Minor women might need a longer time to decide, because
they may be unable or unwilling to accept the fact of their pregnancy, because they may need guidance from parents and other
adults in their lives, or because, in particularly unfortunate circumstances, they may need time to approach a court for a judicial bypass. In addition, some severe birth defects may only be
discoverable later in the pregnancy.
In Roe and Casey, the Court chose the point of viability as
the period at which the second right to abortion ends. That line
is somewhat arbitrary; Justice Blackmun's original idea in Roe
was to draw the line at the end of the first trimester, but other
Justices pointed out that this would not give some womenparticularly poor women- sufficient time to decide, and so
Blackmun eventually settled upon the end of the second trimester.140 But even this factor is arbitrary and subject to changes in
medical technology. In Casey, the Court noted that by 1992, developments in neonatal care had pushed the average point of vi1
ability back from 28 weeks in 1973 to 23 or 24 weeks.
Despite these objections, the Court in Casey retained the
viability rule first announced in Roe, arguing that "there is no
line other than viability which is more workable. " 142 It offered
two substantive justifications for its choice: First, "viability ... is
the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining
and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent
existence of the second life can, in reason and all fairness, be the
object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the
143
woman." Second, drawing the line at viability "has, as a practical matter, an element of fairness. In some broad sense, it might
be said that a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the State's intervention on behalf of the developing
144
child." These arguments suggest that the Court thought it was
making its own independent determination of what constituted a
reasonable time for women to decide.
Perhaps the Court was ultimately correct that a uniform line
should be drawn at viability, regardless of the age or poverty of
have fewer resources, the burdens of compelled motherhood-and the derailing of lives
that comes with it-may be far more significant for them. Casey's "undue burden" test is
flawed to the extent that it protects the second right to abortion for only a segment of
American women.
140. GARROW, supra note 108, at 580-85.
141. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860.
142. /d. at 870.
143. /d.
144.

/d.
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pregnant women or the different circumstances that different
women face. But it does not follow that the Court should have
drawn the line, at least in the first instance. The issue of what is a
reasonable time to decide combines a number of different factors and is inherently legislative. For example, legislatures might
decide to extend the time for women in special circumstances in
ways that would be inappropriate for courts. Instead of drawing
its own line, the Court should have simply announced that
women had certain basic rights- a right to preserve life and
health and a right to a reasonable time to decide whether to become a parent, and then leave it to legislatures to balance the
various considerations of fetal development, women's practical
abilities, and the different obstacles faced by different women in
different situations.
That would not mean that courts would have nothing to say
on the matter. They would eventually decide whether state legislatures had met their constitutional obligations. The first right is
relatively straightforward: legislatures would have to allow for
abortions whenever life or health was threatened. The purpose
of the second right is to give pregnant women a fair and realistic
opportunity to decide whether or not to become mothers. Hence
legislatures rewriting their abortion laws would have to demonstrate that their statutory scheme had provided such a fair and
realistic opportunity.
The approach I advocate is discourse shaping- it demands
that the arguments and justifications a legislature offers to support a law's constitutionality respond to particular constitutional
goals and concerns that a court identifies. In this case, it requires
legislatures to justify their abortion regulations in terms of how
they affect women's practical equality in civil society and their
practical ability to choose whether to become mothers, rather
than solely in terms of the developmental stage of the fetus. If
courts merely struck down existing abortion laws and demanded
that legislatures passed new ones, legislatures might make their
decisions based on pictures of fetuses. But if courts tell legislatures that they must justify the lines they draw based on whether
they provide women a reasonable opportunity to decide whether
to become mothers, they will have to organize their discussions
and their justifications around the choices and obstacles that real
women face. Courts would then decide whether those justifications were sound according to the basic constitutional principles
they laid out in their original opinion.
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There is a rough analogy between my "discourse shaping"
approach and the Vermont Supreme Court's 1999 decision in
Baker v. State, 145 which held that the Vermont Legislature had a
"constitutional mandate" under the state's constitution to find a
way to give same-sex couples the "same benefits and protections
146
afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples."
The Baker court explained the constitutional principles that the
legislature had to comply with, but it left appropriate enforcement of those constitutional principles to the legislature in the
first instance, noting that the legislature could extend marriage
rights to same-sex couples or create a form of "domestic partnership" with similar rights and benefits. In response, the legislature
created the nation's first civil unions law. By inviting legislative
participation and innovation in enforcing constitutional guarantees, the Vermont Supreme Court diffused much of the political
backlash that might have flowed from its groundbreaking and
controversial decision. By contrast, when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that gays were entitled to marry in
47
Goodridge v. Department of Public Hea/th/ it refused to give
14
the state legislature any leeway in enforcement. s Although the
Massachusetts Legislature ultimately complied with the court's
decision, the Goodridge case quickly became identified-far
more than the Baker decision in Vermont-with courts imposing
controversial solutions on majorities. Thus, it may have created a
far more powerful backlash.
My discourse shaping approach makes even fewer demands
on the legislature than the Baker court, because it does not specify when the cutoff point for abortions must take place. It merely
requires that legislatures make findings about what period of
time is sufficient to give pregnant women a fair and realistic
chance to end their pregnancies. It brings the legislature into the
process of articulating constitutional guarantees and therefore
gives them a sense of democratic responsibility and ownership
for the result.
This approach is not "minimalist" in Cass Sunstein's sense
of the word. Sunstein has argued that courts should rule nar145. 744 A.2d 864 (1999).
146. /d. at 886. The New Jersey Supreme Court recently adopted a similar solution.
Lewis v. Harris. 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (giving legislature 180 davs to amend the marriage statutes or enact a statutory structure that afforded committed same-sex couples
the same rights of married couples.). On December 21. 2006. the New Jersey state legislature responded by passing a civil union act. New Jersev Public Law 2006. c.103.
147. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
148. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate. 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
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rawly on constitutional questions wherever possible and they
should be reluctant to give controversial substantive reasons for
their decisions, hoping instead to ground doctrine on reasons
that most people can agree to. 149 Sunstein believes that by proceeding in this manner courts can make modest progress in promoting constitutional values and catalyze legislative protection
of constitutional rights without generating a counterproductive
political reaction. 150
I agree that these are worthy goals but doubt that minimalism is always the best method. Judges do not have to write
minimalist opinions to respect democratic processes or to avoid
a backlash. To the contrary, giving a legislature guidance about
what constitutional principles are at stake may be a better way of
facilitating a legislative solution that is both constitutionally and
democratically acceptable. If the court says nothing, or very little, about what principles guide its decision, and simply throws
the issue back to legislatures without explanation, legislatures
may respond with solutions that courts must repeatedly strike
down, and that experience may well exacerbate political tensions
and lead to backlash effects. Instead of hiding the ball in a minimalist decision, courts should explain why the constitutional
rights they seek to protect are important, and what they will be
looking for when they review the legislature's work.
Under my approach, the Court would have done something
closer to what it did in the death penalty cases, which were decided around the same time. 151 It would strike down old abortion
laws and require the states to create new ones guaranteeing the
two rights to abortion. Although the right to life movement was
152
gathering steam well before Roe, there was still strong sentiment for abortion reform throughout the country. In the political
149. CASS R. SUNSTEIN. ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MJNIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1996).
150. /d. at 59 (Judicial intervention in highly controversial cases "may produce an
intense social backlash. in the process delegitimating itself as well as the goal it seeks to
promote.").
151. In Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238. 239-240 (1972), the Supreme Court struck
down the nation's death penalty laws because they were so arbitrary as to violate the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against Cruel and Unusual Punishments. The Court
detailed what made the implementation of the death penalty constitutionally infirm. and
then waited for states to pass new laws. Then in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
the Court began a long process of selectively upholding and striking down various death
penalty laws and procedures, moving in rough coordination with the public's changing
views about the death penalty. Although the Court has hardly escaped cntictsm for tts
death penalty jurisprudence. it has not generated the same degree of backlash as the
Court's abortion decisions.
152. BURNS. supra note 11 L Garrow, supra note 111.
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climate of the early 1970's, most states would probably have
guaranteed a basic right to abortion perhaps averaging around
twenty weeks, halfway through the term of a normal pregnancy,
along with a host of various regulations and exceptions. For example, in February 1972, almost a year before Roe was decided,
the American Bar Association had advocated repeal of abortion
laws up to the first twenty weeks, midway between the end of
the first and second trimesters. 1' 3 We should not overestimate the
degree of liberalization that the 1970's would have produced
without Roe, particularly as the right-to-life movement energized
and abortion rights became increasingly identified with feminism
and the ERA. New abortion laws would probably not have given
women guarantees as extensive as those which originally ap4
peared in Roe and Doe v. Bolton. 1'
After many states passed new abortion laws and created
legislative records justifying them, the Supreme Court would be
able to evaluate legislative decisions and fix upon a minimum set
of standards for outlier jurisdictions. Because it would be reviewing comprehensive schemes that legislatures themselves had devised, the Court would be exercising less of a traditionally legislative and more of a traditionally judicial role. The legislative
decisions would also possess a greater democratic legitimacy
than a one-size-fits-all requirement imposed by a court. This
would not end all controversies over abortion, but it would have
given the abortion right a firmer, more democratic grounding
than the actual decision in Roe did.
To be sure, a small number of states would have insisted on
virtually no abortion rights, or would have made spurious determinations that a very short time-say three weeks-was all
the time that women needed to decide. However, precisely because these states would be outliers, it would be far easier for the
Court to hold their restrictions unconstitutional. Instead of the
Court choosing its own line and then imposing it on all of the
states simultaneously, the Court could point to the laws created
by the majority of states as evidence that these outlier states
were not protecting women's rights adequately. In addition, it
would be far easier for the Court to show that these legislatures
had not seriously engaged with the substantive guidelines the
Court set out in its initial opinion- to give women a right to pro-

153.
539.
154.

See Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. I 13. 146-47 & n.41: GARROW. supra note 108. at

410 U.S. 179 (1973) (striking down parts of Georgia's abortion law).
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teet their health and life throughout the pregnancy and give
women a reasonable time and a fair and realistic opportunity to
decide whether or not to take on the obligations of motherhood.
Finally, by leaving the length of the second right up to legislatures in the first instance, the Court would, ironically, have
empowered defenders of abortion rights far more than it did by
imposing a single national solution in Roe v. Wade. Roe's trimester formula-which effectively imposed a model abortion statute
on the entire country-simultaneously gave pro-choice forces a
enormous victory and seriously demobilized them. Faced with
mounting pro-life opposition, defenders of abortion rights repeatedly diverted resources to litigation because they assumed
that the federal judiciary would ultimately back them up. But if
courts had guaranteed only the basic outlines of a right to abortion and left many of the details of abortion regulation open,
pro-choice advocates would have been forced to devote their resources to gaining public support for abortion rights and forging
political compromises that would win in legislatures and would
appeal to a broad segment of the American public. Having to
fight the details of abortion regulation in the political process
would probably have helped secure both the democratic character and the democratic legitimacy of abortion rights.
Of course, this not what the Supreme Court did in Roe.
Rather, it imposed a single solution to the second right to abortion in 1973. As a result, the federal judiciary has gradually been
pushed toward a compromise position anyway through decades
of social movement mobilization against abortion rights, through
the transformation of one of the two major political parties into
a pro-life party that eventually dominated American politics,
and through a series of Republican judicial appointments that
often put abortion rights on an insecure footing. Indeed, although the Casey opinion suggested that it was reaffirming the
"central holding" 1' ' of Roe, it actually overturned significant
elements of Roe v. Wade and moved toward a new judiciallycreated compromise. To be sure, it was not necessarily the best
political settlement that pro-choice forces might have otherwise
obtained: it allowed state legislatures to deny the nation's most
vulnerable women-particularly poor women and women living
in rural areas- their effective rights to abortion while doing little
to stem the resentment and determination of pro-life forces. But
155. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 505 U.S. 833. 86061.864-65.873.879.
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a compromise it was, nevertheless. The history of abortion law
from Roe v. Wade onward shows the familiar lesson of American
constitutional politics- the Court is part of the dominant national coalition, and no matter how much it insists that it is
above everyday politics, the Supreme Court's doctrines will
eventually gravitate toward the center of public opinion. The
real question is on what terms it will gravitate. Given these facts,
the Court could have saved itself a great deal of needless trouble, put abortion rights on more secure footing, and shown
greater respect for democracy if it had engaged in a more conscious process of interaction with Congress and state legislatures
over the scope of the second right to abortion.
Does this mean that the Court should now overturn the viability rule and return the scope of the second right to the states?
As noted earlier, even without Roe, most states would probably
guarantee a qualified right to abortion, but many- perhaps up to
a dozen-would ban almost all abortions. That might sound
promising for a the sort of approach I advocate, but unfortunately,
one cannot turn the clock back to the early 1970's and start all
over again. The current political structure in the United States has
been produced in part because of the controversy over Roe v.
Wade, and many judges have been appointed to the bench in significant part because of their opinions about Roe. Those judges
who would be willing to return abortion regulation to the states at
this point are the same judges who would be delighted to eliminate the constitutional right to abortion completely. It is very
unlikely that, once Roe were overruled, and states left to design
their own abortion laws, that the Supreme Court would then reinstate a national constitutional right to abortion, even if most states
subsequently guaranteed some form of a right. Once the Court returned the issue of abortion to the states, it would be very hard for
a future court to impose a national rule against outlier states once
more. Like it or not, if one thinks that the Court was correct that
there is a constitutional right to abortion (albeit for different reasons than stated in Roe), it is probably better to work within the
Roe/Casey framework than to hope that by overturning it one
would obtain something that better protected the constitutional
rights of women. Unlike an expectation originalist, I do not think
that the Court recognized a right that it should not have, and that
we are stuck with that right because of reliance or stare decisis.
The Court correctly recognized that there was a right to abortion;
but its construction of how to protect that right- the trimester system- was flawed. Since then it has moved to a new construction
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that is probably the best one can do under the political circumstances produced by the original decision.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Roe v. Wade and the right to abortion have often been
viewed as a controversial symbol of a "living constitution" that
cuts itself adrift from the Constitution's text and history and, in
the view of its critics, becomes no more than a question of contemporary politics exercised by the judiciary. This is a false portrait reflecting a false dichotomy between fidelity to the constitutional text and a living Constitution. The Constitution, and
particularly the Fourteenth Amendment, was written with the
future in mind. Its drafters deliberately chose broad language
embracing broad principles of liberty and equality.
Fidelity to the Constitution means applying its text and its
principles to our present circumstances, and making use of the
entire tradition of opinions and precedents that have sought to
vindicate and implement the Constitution. Reasonable people
may disagree on what those principles mean and how they
should apply. But the larger point about constitutional interpretation remains. We decide these questions by reference to text
and principle, applying them to our own time and our own situation, and in this way making the Constitution our own. The conversation between past commitments and present generations is
at the heart of constitutional interpretation. That is why we do
not face a choice between living constitutionalism and fidelity to
the original meaning of the text. The two are opposite sides of
the same coin.

